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This study investigates the hypothesis that the

acquisition of literacy enables more precise comprehension of language, spoken as well as written.

The influ-

ence of literacy acquisition on language comprehension is

demonstrable in rural Third World settings with marginally
literate adults.

Solving syllogisms is a difficult task

for non-literate villagers; however, the cause of the

difficulty most people--not merely non-literate villagers
have with syllogisms is that the premise is not understood.

Individuals reason on their personal interpretation of the

premise and not on the terms as stated in the problem.
In this respect, performance on syllogisms can be used as
a measure of comprehension of the language of the premise.

To justify the effects of literacy acquisition, a theoreti-

cal argument is constructed that children's comprehension

begins with a heavy dependence on contextual cues for the

VI

meaning of utterances.

By late childhood the child develops

greater ability to use linguistic cues—
semantic and syntactic--for meaning in language. The acquisition
of literacy--the process of understanding language
devoid of contextual and prosodic cues--is proposed as a
catalyst for

refining precise language comprehension by focusing
attention on the semantic and syntactic cues inherent in
the

written text.
If syllogism performance is a measure of language

comprehension as well as reasoning, and if the acquisition
of literacy benefits language comprehension, then reading

skill should correlate positively with syllogism perfor-

mance and with remembrance of the syllogism premise.

To

test this, 112 marginally literate, rural, adult Jamaican

women were asked to solve four orally presented syllogisms.
Measurements were made of the syllogism solution, recognition of the premise statements, and reading skill.

The

data supported the hypothesized correlations, but also

reflected the role of cultural demands on precise language
comprehension.

Correlational studies do not, of course,

provide conclusive evidence of cause and effect.

However,

the results are consistent with the theoretical argument

for causality:

the acquisition of literacy is one factor

which develops and refines strategies for using semantic
and syntactic cues in the comprehension of language.
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CHAPTER

I

PURPOSE OP THE STUDY

Introduction
The purpose of this study,

in the broadest terms,

is to describe the relationship between literacy and

language comprehension.

Heretofore, it seems the un-

stated assumption by educational psychologists and reading
teachers alike has been that the basis for acquiring

reading skills is oral language comprehension.

The vali-

dity of that relationship in many circumstances is not

called into question here.

This study seeks to establish

the point that causal relationships may be the reverse as

well--that the acquisition of literacy has a substantial
impact on language comprehension, even when aural.
"Literacy" in the context of this study does not pertain
to literary achievements but rather to the acquisition

of the rudimentary reading skills; and "language compre-

hension,

"

to understanding simple,

logically-related

sentences
It is interesting to note that comprehension diffi-

culties due to lack of literacy are sparsely evidenced
in developed 'Western cultures where language is the

vehicle of transmission of all types of knowledge and

practically all children are taught to read by legislative

1
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fiat.

The consequences to educational
policies have been

enormous.

The subtle influences of the
acquisition of
literacy have clouded our view of our
own intellectual
development.
Much psychology, because it has been
formulated and tested in a literate mileau,
cannot differentiate between cognitive skills which are
products of

literacy acquisition or the schooling
experience and those
which develop from chronological maturity.
Because cross-cultural experiments which may extrifrom its literate

'i/tfestern

grounding are

only in the beginning stages, psychologists have not
only

been hesitant to hypothesize the effects of general culture, but also the outcomes of intellectual inheritance
of

cultures.

At present, psychologists seem to be construct-

ing a conglomeration of likenesses before confronting

differences.

The conservative approach to the interpre-

tation of existing data may be appropriate so as not to

substantiate ideas of race superiority, but differences

between Third World and Western cultures are glaring nonetheless.

Anthropologists, looking into non-European cul-

tures, have suggested bold insights into the consequences

of literacy, but these insights become tangled with the

effects of technological and economic development.
This study seeks to shed light on a middle position--

that literacy does have an effect on general language com-

3

prehension and that the effects are not
culturallyspecific but are the same for all people,
irrespective of
culture, who learn to read.
The contention is
that the

acquisition of literacy fosters development
of cognitive
strategies for comprehending language as
words

and syntax.

In other words, more attention must be
paid to the words

and the relationships between them when the
words are

written on a page rather than when they are embedded
in
a conversation rich with contextual cues
for meaning.

As

a person is learning to rea4 he or she develops
and re-

fines strategies to deal with the language at the semantic

and syntactic level.

Essentially, the strategies allow an

individual to arrive at a meaning by means of the linguistic cues alone, without contextual cues.

are useful in all language comprehension

These strategies

— oral

as well as

written
To contend that reading acquisition develops new

strategies in language comprehension, it is, of course,

necessary to establish that aural language comprehension is
not solely based on words and relationships between words,
but also on situational contexts.

The strictly non-

literate subjects of previous studies help substantiate
the argument that language comprehension may be g reatly

assisted by contextuality

.

It is dominant in the beginnings

of language comprehension for children of all cultures.
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The switch from dependence on context to language -based

semantic and syntactic cues will not occur, especially if
(1)

some event (namely, learning to read) does not direct

attention specifically at the words and relationships
between words that comprise language; or

(2)

if the cul-

ture does not place demands on the individual to acquire

knowledge primarily through language.

Neither of these

demands are typically present in rural Third World non-

literate cultures.

Therefore, Third World semi-literate

subjects used in this study are ideal to demonstrate the
influence of literacy.

Significant research has been done on rural nonliterate societies and a portion of this literature is
examined.

The previous research, however, studied totally

non-literate adults who had never attended school.

This

study, on the other hand, used rural semi-literate adults
in a culture that is fairly literate and progressive for
a Third World country --Jamaica.

It established correla-

tions between reading skill and language comprehension

skills as measured by the task of solving orally-presented

syllogisms

Syllogisms are word puzzles, first catalogued by
Aristotle, which require a person to make a logical

inference on information presented in a premise.

As more

research is carried out with syllogisms, the critical
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role of the subjects'
interpretation of the premise statement is becoming more apparent.
If the original premise
IS misunderstood, subjects'
inferences are likely to be
invalid when judged in terms of
the original premise.
The requirements of the syllogism
will be examined shortly
in full.

£Zl lQ^is m task res e a rch in the Third

';tforld

.

Language com-

prehension, per se, has not been isolated
in much experimentation in the Third World. This is not to
say that
language comprehension failures have not affected
performance in other types of problems posed to Third
World nonliterates.

oyllogism tasks require precise comprehension

of simple logically-connected sentences, and have
been a
topic of research in experiments done both in the
West

and the

Third World.

In Africa syllogistic testing has

been carried out in studies by psychologists Silvia Scribner, Michael Cole,

John Gay, and others over a number of

years with the Kpelle and Vai tribes in Liberia.

Alexander

Luria, a Russian psychologist, also used syllogisms in the

1930

's

to test rural peasants in Central Asia.

The goal

of these studies was to ascertain whether "logic" is

related to "culture" and whether logical thinking, easily

conceptualized as Piaget's propositional thinking stage,
was a part of normal maturation.
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A whole array of psychological
tests have been given
to Third World non-literates that
tested perception, memory,

classification, learning, problem-solving, and
deductive
logic.
Non-literate's performance on the syllogism task
has seemed to resist improvement even
when the materials
were modified by using premises which depicted
concrete

culturally-acceptable reality.

Still, a solution rate at

chance levels or below was reported (Cole and Scribner,
1974), well below American high school students whose

solution rate on similar syllogisms was 90 percent (Scribner, 1975).

Nowhere in psychological literature have syllogisms

been an easy task for subjects, and for a number of reasons
to be examined shortly.

Many researchers hold that subjects

reason well, but not necessarily on the information as
stated in the premises.

They reason well on their own

understanding of a problem (Chapman and Chapman, 1959;
Henle, 1962; Relvis, 1974, 1975; Scribner, 1975; Olson,

1978 ).

Evans (1971) has suggested that syllogism research

should measure both the subjects' peculiar understanding
of the premise and the reasoning as well.

The evidence

suggests that failure to comprehend accurately the premise

language and not poor logical reasoning is the underlying
cause for poor performance in syllogism tasks.
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Schooling and literacy ac ^ulsi^,

it is interesting to

..

note that

logic-like" thinking appeared in
Kpelle students
who had reached the third grade
level (Cole and Scribner,
1974).
Schooling does have a clear-cut
effect not only on
syllogism performance, but on the
whole range of cognitive tasks that Gay, Cole, and
Scribner used.
Greenfield, Reich, and Olver

(

1966

speculate how

)

schooling brings about improvement in
verbal ability.
In school children can learn and
practise language in

non-contextual situations.

Thus, sentences begin to carry

the meaning of the communication, and
the formal organiza-

tion of language forces a student to organize
personal

experience or actions in the mold of language.
Granted, it is almost impossible to separate
schooling

from the acquisition of literacy--indeed

,

the raison d’etre

of formal education has been the written language

insights of Greenfield et al

.

,

.

The

notwithstanding, children

are taught to read before children learn to "translate their

experience and actions into words that will satisfy a
teacher.

(p.3l6)"

It is a major contention of this study

that schooling, especially in terms of syllogism perfor-

mance, can be narrowed to the effect of the acquisition of

literacy.

In essence,

the acquisition of reading enables

better overall language comprehension.

Better comprehension

directly improves syllogism performance because the pre-
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mises are better understood and thus reasoning is
more

likely based on the premises as stated.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to explore relationships

between skill in reading comprehension and skill at solving
syllogisms.

The wedding of two seemingly unrelated skills--

reading comprehension and performance on a syllogism task
first requires a theoretical rationale.

The basis for

the rationale is derived from cognitive psychology--speci-

fically from studies in language comprehension and memory.

Research and observations from developmental psychology
are incorporated.

Finally, literature dealing with skills

in reading comprehension is addressed.

All of these are

related to cross-cultural studies in psychology.
Rural Jamaican women with up to nine years of schooling were asked to solve four orally-presented syllogisms.

Subjects were asked to answer the syllogism question and
justify their answer.

An elaborated premise condition

(premises which had been amplified by two redundant statements) was incorporated to enhance subjects’ comprehension
of the premise statement and hence their overall syllogism

performance.

Various measurements were made for memory of

the premise, separate from reasoning performance.

Other

instruments tried to assess the understanding of the con-
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elusion to the syllogism--irrespective of the
ability to
justify verbally that conclusion. A cloze passage
measured
reading comprehension.
i.he

experimental relationships which the data analysis

seeks to establish include the correlations between
skill
at reading comprehension and success at solving
syllogisms

and the correlations between skill at reading comprehension
and memory of the premise.

Additionally, differences in

performance resulting from the elaborated premise condition
are examined.

Outline of the Chapters

Correlational studies require a theoretical justification which unites the elements.

This study in parti-

cular requires extensive rationale because numerous

theoretical links are made in justifying the contention
that the acquisition of reading skill enhances language

comprehension and that accurate language comprehension
is essential to solving syllogisms.

Chapter II, the

Theoretical Underpinnings, details this linkage.
Following that, a presentation of the hypotheses,
design, and experimental variables is presented in

Chapter III.
The data is presented and analyzed in two stages in
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Chapter IV.

Unexpected differences between performances of

occurred,
subjects tested by the two field interviewers
data analyses
oince the interpretations possible on other

effects of the
are affected, these differences and other
grammatical form of the
control or treatment condition, the
are scrutinized
syllogism, and the order of presentation
the interrelaIn the light of these differences,
first.

performance on the syllotionships between reading skill,
premise are estabgism task, and memory of the syllogism
lished and analyzed.
remarks and suggestions
Chapter V presents concluding
for further study.

Limitations
syllogisms to examine possible
This study uses simple
performance and the componcorrelations between syllogism
and
performance-sentence comprehension
ents of syllogism
with basic reading skills.
basic deductive reasoning—
quite
these relationships are
Stated in such a manner,
specifiin this study are
hypotheses
the
however,
broad,
levels— elementary syllogisms,
cally limited to elementary
elementary reading.
elementary sentence comprehension,
were used because the
Simple, valid syllogisms
make them the easi
straightforward relationships
higher levels of reasoning.
Hence implications for
solve
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or more difficult syllogisms, are precluded.

Not all subjects were literate, although many had a

number of years of schooling.

/\fithin

the spectrum of

reading skills possible, most subjects possessed only
limited reading comprehension ability.

With respect to

education, the uppermost limit of the sample was confined
to women with nine years of formal schooling.

Because

subjects represented a middle ground between those tested

previously in Western settings (educated and literate) and
Third World (primarily uneducated and non-literate),

specific comparisons of the results obtained in this study
are limited.

Sentence comprehension was measured by two tasks

neither of which have precedence in established psychological methodology.

Syllogism comprehension was measured

first by an unprompted oral reconstruction of the information in the premise.
for Scribner (1975)

»

Previous syllogism studies, except
have not focused on the specific

measurement of premise recall separate and apart from
general reasoning performance; hence there is little basis
to compare performances.

Secondly, yes-no questions were

used to measure the amount of information which the subject
may have remembered though not made explicit in the

justification or the recall tasks.

Yes-no questions have

never been used to measure memory of the syllogism premise;
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moreover yes-no questions, although
seemingly similar to
sentence recognition tasks, may
entail other cognitive
demands (Akiyama. Brewer, and
3hoben. 1979).
Hence the
results obtained from this tudy are
not readily comparable
with studies in the general area
of sentence recognition.
The data, as collected, lends itself
only to correlational analysis without indication of
any causes or
effects.

The rationale which might justify a
causal

relationship is presented in Chapter II and
discussed
again in Chapter V. Still, conclusions which
are warranted by strict data analysis are support or
rejection of the

positive correlational relationships between reading
skill and language comprehension and reading skill and

syllogism solving.
The data analysis is done in the shadow of Lashley’s

Dictum:

only the product of internal organization is

evident--the actual processes remain conjecture.

The

observables are the performance on the cloze passage
the skill of syllogism solving, and the proficiency of

answering yes-no questions targeted at recognition of
information in the premise.

comprehension

,

The processes of language

reading skill, reasoning and memory merely

cast their shadows.

An attempt at suggesting the organi-

zing processes involved is made in Chapter II in order to

present a rationale for suspected linkages between reading

13

skill acquisition, reasoning, and language comprehension.

Significance
Despite the limitations operant in this study,

several factors make it significant.
the first time

This study represents

(to my knowledge informed by a search of the

relevant literature) that correlations have been attempted

among reading skill, syllogism performance, and oral language comprehension in a Third World setting of semi-literate

adults.

By using as subjects rural Jamaican women of

African origin this study obviated the way in which many
studies in current developmental psychology are confounded-by interaction of processes of maturational development

with consequences of schooling and concomitant acquisition of reading skill.

Cognitive development is held

constant by virtue of the chronological maturity of the
subjects; the degree of reading skill is treated as a co-

variable rather than an intervening variable.
The study uses syllogisms as a tool to investigate

language comprehension as well as performance on the

syllogism task.

How well a subject justifies and later

recalls the syllogism is used as an indication of the
extent to which the syllogism was understood.

Yes-no

questions were used to ascertain how the premise was

internally representated which may not have been evident
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from the explicit recall statement.

Although such method-

is in only nascent states of development,

further

refinement may provide basis for data which could elucidate the role of language comprehension in syllogism

solving.
In terms of implications to education,

this study is

significant because it argues for reconsideration of the
role of literacy acquisition in cognitive development,

especially the comprehension of language.

If the data

collected supports the theoretical argument that the ac-

quisition of reading skill enhances language comprehension,
even aural comprehension, then a case can be made for

emphasis on reading instruction in elementary and secondary
education.
J amaica

Jamaica is an island in the Caribbean, the size of
Connecticut, with a population of over two million.

It

was colonized by the British in the seventeenth century

and gained its independence in 1962.

Although its econo-

mic fortunes have varied since independence,

exports;

(major

beauxite, tourism, and sugar), Jamaica is among

the most developed island of the English-speaking Caribbean.

The official language is English; the spoken rural

language, a patois--a mixture of English words with heavy
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influence of West African tribal language
syntax of the
blacks who were brought to Jamaica as
part of
the rum-

molasses-slave triangular trade of the l?00's
between
the American colonies, and Africa.

it,

Despite the existence of patois, the standard
English
prevails as the prestigious mode of communication.
There
are several daily newspapers of island-wide
circulation.
One newspaper, The Daily Gleaner

,

is noted for the high

caliber of English usage in its editorial pages.

Three

radio stations broadcast throughout the entire island
and
all programming is in standard English.

Many of the pro-

grams on the two government-owned stations are aimed at

providing development-related information useful to rural
Jamaicans

Education is and has been an important priority of the
government even in colonial times.

The British usually

established in their colonies excellent potable water
systems and viable educational institutions.

Jamaica

boasts of a 76 percent literacy rate (UNESCO figures)

although the high figure is questioned by some, and others
believe the standard for literacy is set artificially

low--a fourth grade education.

Adult literacy has been an important government
priority.

In 1972 the government created the Jamaican

Movement for the Advancement of Literacy (JAMAL)

.

J/IMAL
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organizes literacy classes throughout
Jamaica using volunteer teachers. Most of JaMAL's students
are primary
school dropouts who hope to complete
the course-thus

demonstrating an eighth grade reading level.
been a monstrous effort both in terms
of

JAP/IAL

has

the number of

towns with JaMAL centers established and
in terms of costs,

regardless of volunteer teachers.

The success of JAMaL

has been mixed, but the point is the JAMaL
efforts and the

commitment to general education demonstrate the
priorities
of the government and the esteem in which literacy
is

held by the general public.

Considering the newspapers, the radio stations, the
educational system, and JAMAL, it can be unequivocally

asserted that Jamaica is primarily a literate culture.
Greenfield (I969) differentiates between literate cultures
and oral traditional ones.

That Jamaica is a literate

culture will become more germane as the theoretical pre-

sentation unfolds.
The data collected for this study was collected during

August, 1980.
ficant;

Normally dates of collection are not signi-

however, Jamaica was at that time embroiled in a

violent election campaign.

From January, I98O, some five

hundred politically-related killings had taken place.
Besides, having a general paranoia of strangers, people were
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divided so sharply on political issues that social

acquaintances (especially among the lower classes) hinged
on political party affiliations.

The election campaign and the general level of anxiety,

suspicion, and violence it created affected the study in the

following ways.

oelection of interviewers and choice of

areas was limited.

A week after one area was chosen,

the police station was burned down by a politically-

motivated mob.

It became clear that a stranger telling

even stranger stories (the syllogisms) and asking questions

about "thinking" would be viewed with distrust and apprehension.

Of the available women interviewers, the two

whose hometowns were in rural areas were selected.

These

women went to their hometowns to interview in the neighborhood in which they were known.

The interviews were not

recorded on audio tape as had been hoped originally.
Finally, the chief researcher was precluded from accompanying the interviewers, even into the towns.

There was in

Jamaica at that time an inordinate suspicion that every
American, and especially an

member of the C.I.A.

American official, was a

My presence would have bode ill for

the interviewers and the conduct of the study.

CHAPTER

II

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
C ross

Cultural Studies

Testing with syllogisms in cross-cultural contexts

previously has been done in two settings--on the West
Coast of
(

Africa and in Central Asia.

Cole and Scribner

197 ^ and Scribner, 1975) did extensive research with the

Kpelle and Vai tribes in Africa.

These studies are exa-

mined here in some detail and then placed in a larger
context of syllogism solving.

The insights derived from

the examination of syllogism research set the parameters

for the theoretical argument which ensues.
Cole and Scribner (197^) relate an experiment in

which Kpelle Village leaders were tested with orallypresented syllogisms.

After listening to the premise,

the villagers were asked to draw a conclusion and finally
to justify their answers.

The following is an excerpt

of an interchange between experimenter and subject.

Experimenter:

At one time, spider went to a feast.
He was told to answer this question
before he could eat any of the food.
The question is:
Spider and black deer
always eat together.
Spider is eating.
Is

black deer eating?

Subject:

Were they in the bush?

Experimenter:

Yes.

18
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Subject

They were eating together?

Experimenter

Spider and black deer always eat
together.
Spider is eating.
Is black
deer eating?

Subject

But I was not there
such a question?

Experimenter

Can t you answer it? Even if you were
not there, you can answer the question.
(Repeats the question.)

Subject

Oh,

Experimenter

What is your reason for saying that
black deer was eating?

Subject

The reason is that black deer always
walks about all day eating green leaves
in the bush.
Then he rests for a while
and gets up again to eat.
(p. 163)

oh,

.

How can

I

answer

black deer is eating.

Only one third of the non-literate adults answered
the problems correctly (less than chance); of these very

few gave the correct reason for their answer.

The diffi-

culty was not due to the culture or to the structure of
the language.

Kpelle high school students, given the same

syllogisms, responded correctly 90 percent of the time, and
for the right reasons (Cole and Scribner, 197 ^)

The

difference in performance seemed to be due to schooling.

Further evidence indicates that the switch to logic-like
thinking began to appear in the third grade.

Luria
in the 1930

(

1971

's

)

with work done on Central Asian peasants

corroborated this view and added another

dimension when he cited evidence of abilities of literate
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and pre-literate groups to solve
logical syllogisms.

groups could solve syllogisms based on
personal
experience (Cotton grows where it is hot and
^'\/hile

humid.

the village it is hot and humid.
or not?),

In

Does cotton grow there

only the literate group or those "who had

participated as activists in the newly-formed collective
farms" could solve successfully a syllogism beyond
their

immediate experience.

(In the north where there is snow

all year, the bears are white.
north.

Town X is there in the

Are the bears white in that town or not?).

There

was either a refusal to accept the assertions made in the

premise or a hesitancy to draw a logical conclusion in

situations of little personal experience.

In short,

the

subject did not want to lie about what he did not know.
Every one of these types of errors-of the problem not being accepted;

(2)

(1)

the terms

the terms being

modified to conform to a perceived reality; or

(3)

addi-

tional information being brought in to justify the con-

clusion
1962).

— are

made by even American college students (Henle,

In fact,

Henle despaired about the illogic of

American college students.

But compared with American

high school students on similar forms of syllogisms.
Third jVorld villagers are even less logical (Scribner,

1975 )*

In the follow-up study to the one reported in Cole
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and ^cribner (197't),
Scribner (1975) presented a
series
of syllogisms to American
high school students, Kpelle
high school students, and
Kpelle villagers. American
high school students answered
correctly 90 percent of the
syllogisms; Kpelle high school
students, 80 percent, and
Kpelle villagers, 53 percent
a chance rate).
(
The
errors made by all groups were
the same general types, but
the incidence and the severity
of errors are greater among
ihird World viHagGrs,
In that study, Scribner
{1975) attempted to isolate
the factors which were causing
such poor performance among

Ihird .Jorld non-literates.

Scribner had suspected that it

could be the subjects' inability to
remember the premise.
To ascertain the remembrance of
the information
of the

premise. Scribner asked the Kpelle villagers

to

repeat

the premises at two different points
in the experiment—

once after the subject had given his or her
answer and then

again after the experimenter had read the premise
again
very slowly. Her findings confirmed her suspicion.

Two

examples of interchanges follow;
Problem;

subject

The chief's brother either gave him a
goat or he gave him a chicken.
The
chief's brother did not give him a
Goat.
Did he give him a chicken?
s

answer and reason:
to him.

Yes,

I

know he gave it
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Subject's first recall: The chief's
brother will give
him a pat.
If he does not give him a goat
he will give him a chicken.

Experimenter:

What question did

subject:

You asked me, is the chief's brother
going to give him a goat?

Experimenter:

(Reads the problem again).

I

ask?

Subject's second recall:

Yes.
That is what you told
me.
?he chief's brother will give him
a goat.
If he does not give him a
goat, he will give him a chicken.

Experimenter:

What question did

Subject:

You asked me, the chief's brother will
give him a goat.
If he does not give
him a goat, will he give him a chicken?
(Cole and Scribner, 1974 p.165).

I

ask you?

,

ilnd

a second example:

Problem:

Subject

Some kwi (Western) people are wealthy.
All wealthy people are powerful.
Are
some kwi people powerful?
s

answer and reason: Yes, it is because some
kwi are wealthy and they have power.

Subject's first recall:
wealthy.

Some kwi in this town are
Chey have power.

Experimenter:

What question did

Subject:

Do some kwi have power?

Experimenter:

(Repeats the problem)

I

ask you?

Subject's second recall:
Some kwi are wealthy.
They
have power.
Do many wealthy people
have power?
(Cole and Scribner,
1974, pp. 165-166)
The subjects'

first.

recall showed no improvement over the

Never once did either subject recall the premise
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making explicit the elements and their
relationships.
Before progressing with a direct investigation
of

possible causes for poor performance of rural
Third World
villagers, some background in syllogism research done
in

developed cultures will provide a better understanding
with which to view the performance of non-literate peoples
on these tasks.

First the form of a syllogism and its

requirements are presented.

Then several theories explain-

ing syllogism performance are examined.

In investigating

syllogism performance, it is important to keep in mind
that deductive reasoning is not limited to the nature of
the literate.

Examples of deductive reasoning in five and

six year olds will be presented.

The crux of all of the

documented difficulties people of all cultures have with
the syllogism does not seem to be reasoning, per se,

but understanding the exact constraints of the premise,

and correctly representing the terms of the problem.

Not

deficient reasoning but inadequate language comprehension
seems to account for poor performance.

Finally, the

especially poor performance on syllogisms by non-literate
Third World people is explained by linking the disabling

effects of inadequate comprehension of the premise with
the absence of comprehension skills acquired in the compre-

hension of reading.

24

Syllogisms

Syllogisms are deductive word puzzles
in which all
information necessary for the conclusion
is incorporated
in the premise.
There are several types of syllogisms:
the propositional syllogism (if

.

.

.

then.

.

.

)

the three-term

syllogism or linear syllogism (a is larger
than

B,

and B

is larger than C), and the class-inclusion
syllogism (also

called classical or categorical syllogisms).

Class-

inclusion syllogisms are the type used in this and
other
Third i/Vorld studies. They are of the general
form:
Major premise:
iMinor premise:
Conclusion:

Precious metals do not rust.
Gold is a precious metal
(Gold does not rust.)

Typically, the information in the premise is not

redundant.
only once.

The necessary relationships are established

Two discreet elements

(a

subject term and a

predicate term) are united by a common third, called the
middle term.

It is by uniting the subject term with the

middle term and a predicate term to the middle term that
the relationship between the first and the third is apparent.
In the example above,

"precious metals" is the middle

term.
The syllogism requires the solver to assemble the

elements of the premise within their given relationships
and then, realizing that one relationship is implicit,
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to generate it so that the new relationship is
consistent

with the constraints of pre-ordained relationships#

(A

task variation supplies a premise question-- "Does gold

rust? "--which does not require the subject to establish
the new relationship, rather to confirm it.

?he premise

0

question lessens the difficulty because it eliminates
having to work out all alternative relationships.)
The task of the subject is to understand the
premise

and then draw the conclusion.

Except in instances when

the premise depicts truthful statements regarding
familiar

objects (and conclusions follow from real life as well
as the terms of the problem) memory for the terms of
the

premise as stated is essential.

Scribner's results

pinpointed the difficulties Third World peoples have with
syllogisms begin with the memory of the premise statement.
Of course, if the terms are not accepted, the task of the

syllogism is terminated.

And some syllogisms require the

subject to suspend disbelief.

Scribner showed that even

when the task is not rejected, inadequate memory of the
premise statement is a substantial deterrent to success.
Evans (1972) suggested that measuring the subject’s

interpretation of the premise should be included in the
methodology of any study of syllogisms.

Unfortunately,

no tasks have been devised to fathom the subject's under-

standing of the premise independent of direct recall.
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In recent years,

three conceptualizations of syllo-

gistic reasoning have been proposed--the
Atmosphere Hypothesis, the Conversion Hypothesis, and
an unnamed hypothesis (proposed by Johnson-Laird and
Steedman, 1978).
The

Atmosphere Hypothesis (Woodworth and Sells,
1935 Begg
and Denny I 969 ) and the hypothesis
proposed by JohnsonLaird and Steedman have evolved primarily
from experiments using invalid syllogisms (syllogisms
which cannot
;

be solved because there is no single correct
answer).

Consequently these hypotheses of syllogistic behavior
explain better why people cannot reason rather than why
they can.

On the other hand,

the Conversion Hypothesis

(Chapman and Chapman, 1959; Ceraso and Provitera, 1971

)

was based on work done with both valid and invalid syllo-

gisms.

Since all research done in the

Third

syllogism tasks has used valid syllogisms, the

World on

Conversion

Hypothesis is the best suited as the theoretical framework
for this study.
The Conversion Hypothesis states that people do,
in fact, reason logically albeit errors are made in

syllogism tasks.

The errors result primarily from the

subject's misinterpreting the premises; however, granting
these misinterpretations, logical performance is generally

acceptable.

Unsolvable invalid syllogisms become solvable

if the subject limits his subjective interpretation of
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the premise to one particular
meaning.

For example,

multiple and ambiguous meanings of
the word "some" seem
to be the source of many
technical errors, but
if the

subject "converts" the meaning of "some"
to a single
definition, the relationships within the
syllogism premise are clear and the syllogism is
solvable.
Errors in

reasoning on the premise-as-stated are
traceable to subjective interpretation of the premise and
not
to faulty

reasoning.
Of the three hypotheses explaining syllogism
perfor-

mance, the Conversion Hypothesis best accounts
for the

range of human cognition which is brought to bear
in a

syllogism-solving task.

It is not based on the assumption

that the subject understands all possible interpretations
of the premise.

Other studies (Henle, 1962; Evans, 19?2;

bcribner, 1975

have shown that the subject's interpreta-

)

tion of the premise is often not the equivalent of the

premise-as-stated.

The Conversion Hypothesis is the best

explanation describing

how people do reason rather than

why they do not.
The Conversion Hypothesis is consistent with studies

showing that inference is a by-product of the comprehension process.

The landmark article by Bransford, Barclay,

and Franks (1972) shows that people, in a recognition
task,

cannot distinguish actually heard sentences from new
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sentences containing invited
inference they may have made
in the course of comprehending
those sentences.
For
example, subjects identified the
sentence "Three turtles

rested on a floating log and a fish
swam beneath it"
for the original sentence, "Three
turtles rested

on a

floating log and a fish swam beneath
them

.

"

however, demurred identifying the sentence,

Subjects,
"Three turtles

rested b e side a floating log and a fish swam
beneath it."
for "Three turtles rested beside a floating
log and a
fish swam beneath them."

Other studies (Johnson. Bransford,

Solomon, 1973! Kintsch, and Keenman,

197'J-)

have corrobrated

the view that constructive inference is a part
of extract-

ing meaning from a sentence.

Memory is greater than the

sum of its inputs.
Other inferences are made in language comprehension
in the form of presuppositions.

Haviland and Clark (1974)

demonstrated that the presupposition in a statement such
as

"Frank has stopped beating his wife" is fathomed and

remembered
Nothing is arcane about deductive reasoning.

Logi-

cians with their truth-tables and Venn diagrams of sets

and sub-sets have catapulted deductive thinking into areas

generally reserved for high cognitive abstractions;
actually deductive reasoning based on internally conceived
premises of the way-things-are-in-the-world is child's
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play.

Donaldson (1978) demonstrated evidence of five and
six year olds' deductive thinking by parsing
comments

made while listening to stories.
..hat a

lot of things he's taking!
He wouldn't
have... he s only got two hands and
he wouldn't
hands to carry all these
things^^^^
(Premises:
1.
Peter has more to carry than
can carry; 2.
Peter has only two hands.
Conclusion:
It is not possible for Peter to carry
all that he is represented as carrying.
Implied
criticism of the story.)
^

_

must have eaten all her food on the other day."
(Premises:
1.
Houses normally have food in
them; 2.
This house has no food.
Conclusion:
The
food must have been all eaten up.)
^3he

But how can it be (that they are getting married)?
lou have to have a man too."
(The book contains an
illustration of a wedding in which the man looks
rather like a woman. The child thinks it is a picture
of two women.)
(Premises:
1.
You need a man for a wedding;
2.
There is no man in the picture.
Conclusion:
It
can't be a wedding.)
(p.52)

Deductive thinking is not the apex of cognitive performance that some .Vestern psychologists may have supposed.
That notion was based on the observed difficulty in reasoning under experimental situations and unfortunately pri-

marily on invalid syllogisms which could not be solved.
Rather, deductive inference is part of the natural compre-

hensional process which reflects, in Donaldson's words,
"a fundamental human urge to make sense of the world"

(1978, p.ll6).

Just because these studies have been centered pri-
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manly

in the .Vest is no reason to
assume that spontaneous

inference is not an intellectual
gift of all peoples. Cole
and Scribner (19?4) give evidence
that reasoning in nonliterate cultures done on the premise
as reinterpreted is
valid reasoning. Syllogism premises
which described
social situations in the Kpelle village
were typical of
valid reasoning done on reinterpreted
premises. Villagers
would simply reject some of the given premises
and add
additional ones to arrive at a conclusion which
expressed
some "social truth":
Experimenter;

If Flumo or Yakpalo drinks cane juice
the town chief gets vexed.
Flumo is
not drinking cane juice. Yakpalo is
drinking cane juice.
Is the town

chief vexed?

Subject

People do not get vexed with two
persons

Experimenter;

(Repeats the problem)

Subject;

The town chief was not vexed on that
day.

Experimenter;

The town chief was not vexed?
the reason?

Subject;

The reason is he doesn't love Flumo.

Experimenter;

He doesn’t love Flumo?
reason.

Subject;

The reason is that Flumo 's drinking is
a hard time
That is why when he drinks
cane juice, the town chief gets vexed.
But sometimes when Yakpalo drinks cane
juice, he will not give a hard time
to people.
He goes to lie down to sleep.
.

'yVhat

is

Go on with the
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At that rate people do not get
vexed with him. But people who drink
and go about fighting the town chief
cannot love them in the town.
(p.163)

—

'/Jith

respect to the original premises, the conclusion

was wrong, but in the framework of the subject, the con-

clusion was logical

Cole and Scribner parse

Flumo's drinking gives people a hard time.
(Explicit premise)
Yakpalo's drinking does not give people a hard time.
(Explicit premise)
People do not get vexed when they are not given a
hard time.
Explicit premise)
(
The town chief *is a person.
(Implicit premise)
Therefore, the town chief is not vexed at Yakpalo.
(Conclusion)
(p. 163 )
The villagers' performance cited above may stretch
the behavioral descriptions of the

Conversion Hypothesis

as conceptualized by Chapman and Chapman, but the quint-

essence of the explanation holds:

the subject interprets

the syllogism premise in subjective terms and reasons on
the problem framed in that manner.

Successful reasoning on

converted premises was most evident when reasoning about
a familiar social situation for which some available

social truths could be applied.

In other studies in

which social expectations were not so readily applicable
(e.g.

Scribner, 1975)

»

misunderstanding (for example, mix-

ing the terms of the premise in the recall) was more dominant.

This type of performance is explained readily by the
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Conversion Hypothesis.

Blatently fictional topics, such

as the eating habits of deer
and black spiders, were

simply not accepted.

Although outright rejection of the
terms of the problem IS not a part of conversion,
lack of comprehension
of the premise could, in fact,
explain in part why some
Third .Vorld subjects balk at the task.
The refusal may
indicate that no sense could be made
of the premise at
all.

The requisite knowledge for the
solution is incom-

plete or non-existent.

This explains Luria’s reports of

the peasants refusing to "lie”

ner

s

(1971) or Cole and Scrib-

observation that ancillary evidence was often brought

to bear in the justification of the answer

(1974).

Given

the incomplete knowledge base from which to infer
the

answer, the most honest answer available is for a subject
to refuse to answer or to justify answers in terms
of

knowledge of the actual physical world.
i.vidence for the Conversion Hypothesis is found in

both Western and Third Worlds.

The challenge to the re-

searcher is to discover causes of premise misinterpretation and misunderstanding.

The most fertile ground for

investigation could well be among the non-literate or
barely literate because whatever the causes are, as

Scribner (1975) points out, the incidence and severity of
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errors in syllogism performance
are more pronomiced in
Third 'J\/orld subjects.
have broadened the term
"conversion" to denote the
degree of difference between
the original premise presented and the subject's
restatement of it. The concept
applies
equally well to sentence
comprehension. A target sentence undergoes conversion
when a subject recalls it in
such a way that the meaning
of the sentence presented is
altered in its semantic intent.
For the purposes of this
study, recalling an original
sentence "It was the truck
that hit the car" as "The car was
hit by the truck" is
not conversion. The semantic intent
remains intact,
although the syntactic embodiment of the
sentence is altered significantly.
I

Conversion is a concept of degrees as recall
attempts

vary in the amount of integrity of the
meaning preserved.
Examples from actual recalls of the syllogism premises
of this study would be instructive.

"All red-bellied

spiders live in mango trees" was converted by one subject
to

"Only red-oellied spiders live in mango trees."

Another

subject converted the sentence to a more severe degree:
"Red-bellied them don't live in mango trees."
The ensuing sections first establish a conceptual

basis for language comprehension--contextual and linguistical
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cues are examined for their role in comprehension.

Beginning language comprehension in children is shown
to
be primarily contextual in nature.

Greater reliance on

linguistic cues chiefly occurs later and is primarily due
to the beginnings of literacy skills.

Finally, conver-

sions in premise comprehension are examined against the

background of the influence of literacy on language com-

prehension in general.
Input for Language Comprehension
The following section presents a logical consider-

ation of the types of input available to the brain in
language comprehension.

The section is neither a review

of the literature of language comprehension nor a precise

description of the cognitive processes which may be

actively involved in language processing.

Ultimately the

presentation results in a conceptual framework in which
cognitive strategies involved in language comprehension
may be understood.

Speech contains two systems or families of cues:

contextual and linguistic.

Contextual cues include the

prosody, gesticulation, volume, and speed variations of
the speaker,

also, when the substance of the message is

something which is directly observable, the immediate
environment provides contextual cues.

Non-verbal communi-

cation is included in the context as well.
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Linguistic cues are the words and
their syntax in
the message itself, devoid of
contextual cues. These cues
are the semantic and syntactic
elements of the language.
C ognitive

Strategies

In order for the brain to take
advantage of any cue,

whether language-related or perceptual,
the cue must be
detected and analyzed for its inherent
information which
contributes to the perception of meaning. This
process of
analysis, an interaction of the cognitive mechanisms
of

attention, memory and ones view-of-the-world

cognitive strategy

.

"

,

is a

The notion of a cognitive strategy

is a fictional convenience.

Obviously there are processes

in the brain that enable the person to take

advantage of the contextual and linguistic cues--these

attention-memory interactions are aggregated as "cognitive
strategies

.

In the following pages the general character of cogni-

tive strategies is considered.

Inherent within the dis-

cussion of cognitive strategies is consideration of the

organization of memory; an organization which affects the
nature of the cognitive strategies, and v/hich is in turn
may be refined or altered as a result of new cognitive
inputs

Cognitive strategies are best conceived in a context
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of overall memory processes.

Under the direction of

memory, cognitive strategies analyze
and organize detected
information in a manner that is compatible
with other
usually highly organized information already
stored in the
brain.
In other words, strategies not
only accrue sensory information for the purpose of
comprehension, but

they are also responsible for its processing

— analysis

and

organization--so that the input may be stored in the
memory
as

"knowledge."
Some cognitive strategies and consequent organization

of sensory information may be innate, but others are

learned.

Another word for an innate wired-in strategy is

"instinct," and in human beings, instincts are few.

A great

many strategies are learned through interaction with the
environment.

Linguistic strategies, for example, accrue

as a function of the amount and quality of an individual’s

comprehension of language.

The contextual situation,

the

complexity of cuing systems, the tolerance for variations
from precise interpretations all make up the quality of
the encounter.

of Language

(This theme will recur in the "Processes

Acquisition.")

Cognitive strategies are keyed to the cuing systems
but the correspondence is not necessarily one-to-one.
an individual may not have strategies for every conceivable
cue in a system.

It is possible that the individual per-
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forms adequately without access
to a particular cue or
that a strategy has not yet been
developed.
It follows that the more cues
that are available to

a person,

the greater the possible breadth
of the informa-

tion base from which to build
comprehension.

People with

a large arsenal of varied
strategies stand a better chance

of making meaning of any message
than those with limited

strategies.

The process is developmental:

as strategies

accrue, greater use of a cuing system as
the basis for

comprehension is possible.

In summary,

as the number of

the strategies increase through the practice of
comprehend-

ing language, the more useful the cuing systems
become for

language comprehension.
The Organization of Memory

The components of memory are organized even at
its

very finest gradations representing the make-up of
features.

Language input and all sensory inputs in gen-

eral are interpreted and stored in the brain in a syn-

thesized code (Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield, 1979).
The code transforms the input into a uniform system which

allows for comparisons with other inputs; constructions
of the original input which adhere to the semantic and

grammatical constraints of language.
Organization need not be restricted to simply internal
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sensory codes.

Subjects asked to "organize" lists of words

showed equal recall performance as subjects asked to
"learn" the same material (Mandler, 196?).

Of course

people always organize to recall information--whether on

experimental lists of nonsense syllables or on one for
groceries.

ifeemonic techniques offer a structured frame-

work which can subsume the to-be-remembered information.
Miller, Galantner, and Pribram's "One is a bun, two is a
shoe,

three is a tree..." (1964) provide the structure;

what is left to the inventiveness of the memorizer are the

connections at each point.
Memory seems to be organized throughout the system.

Theories of propositional networks, for example Kintsch
(197^)# are useful in conceptualizing overall cognitive

organization inherent in linguistic comprehension.

A

rule-governed framework, not unlike the constraints placed
on language by syntax,

constitutes the basis of the

propositional network's organization.
Organization in the grandest terms is the basis for
Schank and Ableson's "scripts" (1977) or Rummelhart's
"story grammars" (1975)*

The organizing guidelines are

the life experiences of each individual, and how the

individual conceptualizes them.
Information which cannot fit into the already existing organizational structures runs a considerable risk of

39

"falling on deaf ears.”

If,

in listening to a foreign

language, for example, nothing can
be organized, then
nothing is remembered. The unorganizable
material and the
lack of sufficient strategies for dealing
with the situation blocks meaning-making efforts.

another example, less extreme than listening
to a
foreign language, may be instructive. Jamaican
Peace

Corps Volunteers told a story of a community
meeting in

which government rural development workers carefully
and repeatedly explained a recently set-up housing
trust
to sugar cane workers.

Later, when the villagers were

confronted with their monthly payments and other invidious
impositions of government bureaucracy, they swore that
these were no part of any of the explanation they had

ever received.

No one had been remiss; simply, the vill-

agers’ memories were not organized to include the intri-

cacies of a housing trust.

During the introductory meeting

all of the explanation which did not fit into already

established memory organization fell by the wayside.
The ability to remember information is only as good as the

memory's inherent organization.

Acquisition Period for Language Comprehension
The learned nature of the strategies for language

comprehension was brought out in the previous section.

4o

Because the child is not born speaking, the
strategies
used for language production must be learned.

Strategies

for language production go through predictable
stages

manifested in "baby talk,

"

though the specific content

for each stage varies from child to child (Bloom,
1974).

Controlled experiments, reviewed shortly, indicate that

sophistication in comprehension increases as well; however, these are not so easily observable as the "baby talk"
in the earlier stages.

The development of comprehension and

production skills indicate an acquisition period for language

.

(The focus of this study is language comprehension,

not production, but the concept of an acquisition period

applies to both.)
The acquisition period is the time required to develop

strategies to deal with language input.

The mastery

finally developed is what is required to allow an in-

dividual to act upon the linguistically-imbedded information; the extent of mastery is defined by the task re-

quirements (for example, understanding instructions), or
the expectation of the message sender (the intent of the

speaker), or the cultural demands (how one is expected
to act on information)
is attained,

.

Once an adequate comprehension

the acquisition of strategies tapers off be-

cause additional strategies, which could conceivably allow
more precise understanding, are not really demanded by the
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communication situation.
not necessary.

New strategies are simply

The argument that sufficiency
arrests

the drive for perfect
comprehension may add an unexpected
philosophical twist. However, few
adults sharpen mathe-

matics skills simply for
self-actualization. They do so
for reasons of self-interest.
The point that sufficiency
defines the upper limits for the
acquisition of language

comprehension skills will not be belabored.

acquisition periods may be typical of
all communication mediums.
Please note "mediums,”
as used in this

context is pluralized by the addition
of an "s" rather than
changing to the Latin root plural form
"media",

r.iedia

in

common parlance denotes radio, television,
and the like.
Medium, as the term is used here, refers to
language,

mathematics, units of time, scores of music--symbol
systems constructed by human beings to denote or
measure

some other reality.

Each medium is comprised of elements

and rules which determine the relationship between the
elements.

In language,

the words themselves are the

elements which are bound together in orderly relationships by the syntax.
The medium itself has properties which can prolong
the acquisition period.

The number of elements or the

complexity of relationships which bind the elements may

lengthen acquisition periods considerably as the numbers
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increase.

On the other hand, redundancy
among the ele-

ments or types of relationships mitigate
the effects of
the sheer magnitude of elements and
relationships.
Language, in particular, is blessed
with both--a complexity
which allows articulation of almost any
meaning along with
a sufficient redundancy which
provides an individual a

basis to predict letters, words, or even
meanings as a

strategy for comprehension (Smith, 1975).
The actual numbers of elements and relationships

sufficient for communication are determined by the com-

plexity of the particular message and the cultural demands
of the communication context.

These are the identical

factors which determined the length of the acquisition
period.

In fact,

all are interrelated.

Even though

additional elements and rules may be available in a
theoretical sense, a particular situation or a general
cultural mileau may not demand their use, hence their

acquisition is unnecessary.

Vocabulary and syntactical

relationships that are considered unnecessary or irrelevant
are not likely to be acquired.

Another factor peculiar to language comprehension
which alters considerably the amount or degree of acquisition is the interaction of the two cuing systems;

textual cues and linguistic cues.

con-

Neither cuing system

is exclusive in the process of aural comprehension.
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Rather the two are complimentary.
tion,

^Jepending on the situa-

the contributions of the two cuing
systems toward

comprehension may not be equal.

In face-to-face situations

context may have more influence; when reading the
written
word or listening to a lecture, contextual cues,
aside
from those embedded in the passage, play almost no
role.
To illustrate the effects of context consider
the

plight of an artist.

To depict an eye, alone and out of

context, the artist must supply considerably greater detail

than were a full face depicted.

With a circle for a face

and lines for noses, mouths and ears, then a dot or a
line for an eye would suffice.

As the amount of contextual

evidence increases, the need for perceptual detail diminishes.

Likewise, with language, contextual cues,

along with the shared knowledge of those involved in the
communication, provide much of the information necessary
to arrive at the meaning of an utterance.

If a listener is

unable to infer from contextual cues or does not "know"

what a speaker is talking about, then the resources for

meaning are primarily linguistic in origin.
Contextual cues are a convenient short-cut to meaning
both at the stage of the very beginnings of language com-

prehension and as an individual progresses through the
acquisition period.

The following section presents a brief

overview of the evolution an individual's dependence on
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contextual cues and linguistic cues.
Processes of Language Acquisition
At the very beginnings of language comprehension,

context is the singular cuing system for an infant to
arrive at meaning.

Foss and Hakes (1978) point out that

adult verbal interactions with children are primarily

directed at the immediate situation thus affording the
child ample contextual basis for their interpretations.

Macnamara (1972) puts it aptly:

"Infants use meaning as

a clue to language rather than language as a clue to

meaning."

Donaldson (1978) adds eloquently:

stages ... language is embedded.

which accompany it.

.

"In the early

.in the flow of events

So long as this is the case, the

child does not interpret words in isolation--he interprets

situations."

The task of the child is to uncover thd

relationship between the words spoken and the meaning
intended by the speaker as mediated by the child's under-

standing of the environmental situation in question.
child does this to learn to speak, and not, as

The

Donaldson

admonished, because the child's comprehension of adult's

communication with him or her is inadequate.

Simply to

listen and to understand in broad terms what is being
said to him or her, the child could operate comfortably
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with little linguistic knowledge.
Contextual cues take precedence in
beginning comprehension. As the child presses to learn
to speak,

he or

she must link up the features of the
utterance with the

meaning inherent in the situation.

These efforts provide

the basis for the development of semantic
and syntactic

cues.

Semantic strategies seem to be the ones
developed

first.

Two-and-a-half to three year olds seem to listen
primarily to singular words and from the meanings
of

selected, individual words interpret the meaning of
the

utterance,

structural implications are beyond them.

Stronner and Nelson (197^) asked two to five year old
children to move dolls to enact improbable statements
such as "The mouse chased the alligator" as well as its
more probable opposite.

Three year olds interpreted

both sentences on the basis of real-world probabilities-alligators chase mice.

Improbable passive sentences were

misunderstood as often as improbable active sentences.
Syntactical structures were ignored as the children appeared to listen for "important" nouns and verbs and assemble

them in some meaningful, though self-ordered relationship.
This is called the "search-for-meaning" strategy.

"Search-for-meaning" has a life-long resilience.

Maxwell (1973) reports that the strategy used in skim-

ming reading material is identical.

The purpose in skim-
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raing,

of course, is not detailed
comprehension, so a

rapid, undifferentiating
strategy is adequate.
By virtue of my personal
foreign language experience.
I can attest to
searoh-for-meaning's usefulness in
situations where the level of language
spoken was beyond ray
comprehension. In Thailand, when I
was thrown into situations where discussions were
on treatment of Cambodian
refugees by Thai authorities, I
found myself listening
for familiar nouns, verbs, and
function words and imagining
as best I could the ways in
which they were related. Then
I would listen with "all
ears" to confirm the meaning I had
arrived at. My knowledge and skills
in Thai were insufficient and the best, and possibly only,
strategy available was search-for-meaning.
In children,

the first inkling of the emergence of

syntactic strategies is attending to canonical
word order.
A three-and-a-half year old performs at a
level worse-thanchance when acting out the words on concrete passive

sentences (Sever, 1970).

Sever hypothesizes that the three-

and-a-half year olds are working on the assumption that
all sentences are formed with subject-verb-object word
order.

These children are not yet attentive to cues of

the function words "by" or "is" with the past participle

which marks the passive intent.

Two year olds are apparent-

ly oblivious to word order and function words because their

4?

performance is at a chance level--"superior " to
the threeand-a-half year olds only because no emerging
syntactic
strategies confounded the results. Performance
improves

after three-and-a-half

,

indicating the cues in function

words are acquiring greater importance.
The child proceeds from those simplest of strategies
to accumulate a broader arsenal applicable to various

types of communication situations.

Slobin (1973) described

strategies which pertain to syntactic structures and their
order of occurrence.

But even as these syntactic strate-

gies appear, a child may resort to context for meaning.

Adams (1977) suggests that the "child probably needs

relatively little syntactic sophistication to understand
most of what is said to him.

"

The child is guided by

context and stress patterns of the speaker in making his

interpretation
Donaldson (1979) provides a striking description of
children's responses being guided by a situation and not
by the verbal questions being asked.

The task was Piaget's

conservations, but alterations in methodology made it

clear that in Piaget's typical experimental protocols,

children were mesmerized by visual information and were
not even listening to questions which they were capable
of understanding and answering.

The questions children

were "hearing" were not questions about "more" or "less"
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but about the outstanding perceptual
features.
As
shown in other task variations,
the child was aware that
some aspects of physical reality
had remained constant,
but from the child s point of view,
the experimenter should
be asking about what had changed
and not some minor
un-

altered detail-after all, it was the
experimenter himself
who made the change. When some outside
intruder,
a

naughty teddy bear doll (not the experimenter),
messed
up the order of the blocks in a
conservation-of-numbers

task, the child was no longer stumped about
whether equal

numbers of blocks were left present.
The child is "listening" to the context not to the

words.

Carey (1976) provides more experimental evidence of

this type of listening.

She partially filled a glass

with water and, leaving the pitcher on the table, asked
children to make it so there was more water in the glass,
or so that there was less, or so that there was a non-

sensical condition called "tiv."

Before carrying out the

instructions, children who knew the meaning of "more"
and "less" queried the experimenter about the meaning of
"tiv" before acting.

Children who did not ask, did

straightaway what they would have done regardless of
the instructions--filled the glass with more water.

Filling the glass was their all-purpose response to requests for "more" water or "less" water or "tiv."

The
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children were led astray by what they
could see.
The point of these illustrations is

not that children

are oblivious to language.

ments carried on by

They do listen.

Donaldson’s colleagues,

Experi(reported in

Donaldson, 1978) showed that the inclusion
of one word,
an adjective, dramatically increased
children's success
on tasks of classification.

The miscomprehension evident

in the former experiments make it clear that
contextual

expectation was playing a large role in shaping comprehension.

That language was not the sole basis for the

interpretation, even though variations in the methodolosy demonstrate language itself could have been adequate,
is perhaps,

as

Donaldson suggests, an indication that the

child does not have sufficient confidence in his or her

language abilities.

If contrary contextual evidence

appears, attention to linguistic cues is diminished.

Throughout beginning language comprehension, it is
likely that the development of semantically cued compre-

hension precedes the development of syntactically-cued
comprehension.

In the very beginning, children do not

need to base meaning on the words spoken to them; rather

children base their meaning primarily on the context.
AS real world referents become attached to words,

the

words take on meaning and the word's linguistic relationships to other words are judged in terms of context.
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Finally, once the intent of
an utterance is clear,
then
the syntactical cues
available may play a more
important
role in language comprehension
and subsequent production.
Huggins (1977) gives the role
of semantics overriding
importance in language comprehension.
As observable in
instances of skimming or foreign
language

comprehension-

primary reliance on semantic intent
may be prevalent
throughout life.
Huggins (1977) continues by stating
that children's
ability to deal with syntactic complexity
increases with
age.

The upper chronological boundary of
acquisition

of syntactic strategies is well beyond
the five years

that ^mith (1971) concluded was sufficient
to call the
child fluent." C. Chomsky (I 969 was the
first to show
that comprehension of syntactical structures
continues
)

well past early childhood.

Lesgold

(

1974 ) used fourth

graders as subjects in comprehension tests of
syntactical

structures and documented instances in which children
failed to understand a construction in one context
which they

could understand in another.

Palmero and

f/Iolfese

(I 972

)

argued that it is not until a child is thirteen years
old that gains in ability to understand syntactic structures

begin to taper off.
(

1972

)

In fact,

Kramer, Koff, and Luria

found that even some adults do not correctly

understand infrequent ask -constructions ("Prank asked Mary
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where the movie was playing.")

This discovery not only

reveals the possibility for
life-long development of
syntactic strategies for comprehension,
but also substantiates the earlier contention
that if a particular
structure is not germane to a life
style and overall
linguistic environment, a concomitant
strategy for comprehension need not be developed.

Huggin's statement that the ability
to deal with syntactic complexity increases with age
(I977) however,

strikes a sour note.
to support the claim.

Certainly enough studies were cited
Left unstated is a possibly un-

warranted conclusion--that age may be a direct
covariate
with the ability to deal with syntactical
complexity.

The correlation is undeniably true but
its directness is
specious. Ability to deal with syntactical
complexity

correlates more specifically with the quality and
quantity
of the individual’s

use of language as a communication

medium; use of language accrues with age.

Age and ability

to deal with syntactical complexity do correlate,
but only

coincidentally
Language comprehension is not likely to develop

uniformly across cultures because great discrepancies
may exist between the amount and quality of an individual's
use of language.

In fact, rural non-Western societies,

especially non-literate ones, rely very little on
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language to hand down the
traditional skills of the
culture {Gay and Cole.
1967, Greenfield, 1972).
Nonliterate cultures are called
•'oral” because the
mythology
and folklore can only be
preserved by passing down the
spoken word; on the other hand
education in cultural
traditions is done primarily
through demonstration.
Oral
societies do not rely on the
linguistic medium to pass
on practical knowledge.
It can only be a matter
of speculation how faithfully the mythology
is preserved

in the re-

tellings
In non-literate cultures
context may never lose its

original primary role in comprehension.

Greenfield (1972)

makes a strong case for the role of
context in the speech
of Africans.
Speakers in oral cultures rely heavily
on
context as a basis for their thinking
and communication.
The environmental context not only
defines the nature of
the topic, but the speakers assumption
of a common point

of view with the listener further limits
the topic and
frees both listener and speaker from strict
interpretation
of the meaning based on words.

Indirect evidence of "contextual listening" comes
from
reports of Third World villagers dealing with
Piaget’s con-

servation tasks,
villagers

'

Fuglesang (1973) describes African

performance on conservation tasks which are

strikingly similar to Western children’s.

If Donaldson
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(1978)

IS right in her contention,

children's problems

in conservation tasks are due
to faulty-contextual listening.
That the same faulty listening
could be at the root

difficulties as well is demonstrated in a
story related by Gay and Cole
(196?)
Kpelle villagers,
who could not conserve, were
significantly better than
Peace Corps volunteers at estimating
the volume (in mea.

sures) of piles of grain.

Their difficulties with the

conservation tasks had to be linguistically-based,
or else
they would not have done so well in the
straightforward
task.

Clearly, their difficulty sprang from the
identical

source as young children's difficulty-- a normally
adequate

contextual language comprehension was thwarted by the

experimental condition.
I

suggest that a Third

‘y\/orld

villager raised in an

oral culture in which all communication is aided by context, has considerably less need for linguistically-based

comprehension strategies than his Western counterpart.

I

am not contending that no linguistically-based strategies
exist,

only that they are not refined.

Some linguistically-

based strategies must exist or else the villagers would

grow up mute and dumb.

But the refinement necessary for

communication within the confines of a more or less
immediate context or within the boundaries of a shared
knowledge is nowhere as great as refinement needed to
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understand non-contextual
information, with little
else
than linguistic cues to
rely on.
Furthermore.

suggest that there is an
occurrence
in the life of a Western
child which provides the
particular quality of the practice
necessary.
The child is confronted with language containing
a minimum of external
cues.
The absence of context creates
a dilemma in the
choice between possible meanings
because that choice must
be based on language cues
alone.
Having to deal with a
language stripped of outside
context requires the development and refinement of strategies
targeted to semantic and
syntactic cues. Thus the individual
has the unique opportunity to separate the words that have
been used from the
situation about which the words have
been used. That
encounter with language, available to
the Western child as
a part of his or her developmental
process, is the encounter
with literacy.
I

The Role of Reading
A brief review of the differences
between the require-

ments of the written word and the spoken word
will set
the stage for an important point:

the written word dimin-

ishes the availability of contextual cues and to
compensate,

during the acquisition of reading skills, refined linguistic
strategies are developed.

The analysis will focus on the
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special cognitive requirements and unique
opportunities
offered by the printed word.

Comprehension of the spoken

word will be contrasted when appropriate.

Two areas of

contrast are especially important--the physical nature
of
writing and speech and the differences in the situation
in which they are used.

The subsequent analyses follow

Schallert, Kleiman, and Rubin (1977).

Thephysical nature

.

The permanence of the written word

is of great convenience to the reader.

The written word

allows the reader the choice of the pace at which new

material is to be comprehended (reading rates vary significantly with difficulty of material) and control over the
amount of detail useful for the purposes of understanding
the material

another advantage is that the written word is per-

manent on the page, not ephemeral when spoken.

A reader may

reread single words or portions of passages which were
not immediately clear and the reader is permitted to linger
over them until they are understood.

ramifications

:

Re-reading has other

prediction of the content of upcoming text

(ranging from a word-to-word prediction to predictions
for concepts and outcomes) is not unaffordably risky to

overall comprehension.

dhould a prediction miss the mark,

a reader may retrace words or the story line or the argu-
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ment until the misconception is rectified.

On the other

hand, prediction, when it is successful,
greatly reduces
the cognitive burden of analyzing every
cue or set of
cues available in the passage.
In fact, it is quite

plausible that a good reader can ignore many cues
at a
graphemic, lexical, or even syntactic level (Smith,

1971).

It is becoming clear to psychologists studying
reading

that comprehension of the written word fosters two
skills

which are not linguistic in nature, but bear directly
on
the quality of the comprehension processes.

In .order to

determine when rereading is required, the quality of the

comprehension of the text must be continuously monitored

.

In other words, a reader must be attuned to his or her

own possible miscomprehension

— when

the reader's expecta-

tions and actual input begin to diverge.

Furthermore, some

evaluation of the reading material is necessary in terms
of its importance so that the material may be read with

appropriate care.

Schallert et al (1977) in their review,

note little is known about the mechanisms of monitoring
or evaluation or how these skills develop.

On the other hand, oral stress and cadence along

with the predominately face-to-face context of speech
give it several advantages over the written word.

Prosody,

stress, gesticulation, provide a wealth of cues which can

separate spoken phrases into manageable comprehension
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units.

Gestures to the immediate environment
can quite
literally point out the topic and main
points of the con-

versation.
.^challert, et al., note that for a reader
to overcome

the innate disadvantage of lack of
prosody and gesticu-

lation, he or she must make greater use of
syntactical
cues to divide a word string into meaningful
phrases and
to isolate important points.

From linguistic cues alone,

the reader must carve out the phrases within
which re-

lationships are meaningful (such as an adjective to a
noun).

Then phrase units are united meaningfully (such as a
subject, a verb, and an object).

Hence, the reader needs

to know much more about the nature of language than
the

listener.

The reader has a practical knowledge of langu-

age that is reflected in the quality and quantity of the

strategies developed for dealing with linguistic inputs.
in the situations in which speech and writing

are used

.

Context is always a part of language compre-

hension, whether oral or written.

The context of simple

everyday speech is usually external

— present

in the situa-

tion in which the oral communication occurs.

Most written

communication, however, must provide its own context

within the text alone.

But whether or not the reader

understands the context provided by the writer depends

58

largely on the prior knowledge of the reader.

The

reader must pay more attention to the setting and
continue
to employ that information for the comprehension
of

successive paragraphs.
n listener,

on the other hand,

is in an oral communi-

cation mileau tailored to his or her needs.

In face-to-face

communication, interaction, even non-verbal gestures,
affects comprehension significantly,

a speaker may repeat

or restate a point prompted by little more than a quizzi-

cal look on a listener’s face.

More direct verbal question-

ing or requests for clarification further adjust oral com-

munication to needs of the listener.
Cognitive demands on the reader

.

Other than the contribu-

tion of prior knowledge for providing a framework for com-

prehension, the reader has recourse primarily to the text
for understanding.

The demands on the reader are complex:

he is called upon to recall personal knowledge, to organize

new information, and to search out linguistic cues in

which the information is embedded.
1977)-

(Schallert, et al

.

,

The struggle for comprehension by a beginning

reader is great, but once skill is attained the reader
carries out these three processes simultaneously.

More-

over, he or she is able to predict upcoming letters, words,

and even ideas which lessens the cognitive processing

59

necessary for comprehension (Smith, 1971).

Finally, the

skilled reader seems able to monitor his or her continuing comprehension of the text and to evaluate the
informa-

tion in the text in relation to his or her purposes for

reading (Schallert et al,,1977).

A reader in order to

understand written text has developed a number of skills

which may not be developed by a listener.
In summary,

the listener usually has a readily per-

ceivable environmental context for reference; furthermore,
a listener may mere easily correct momentary comprehension

difficulties.

To compensate for the loss of environmental

context and the unavailability of further explanation, the

reader must pay strict attention to the text to establish
the meaning of the information.

I

have argued that by

having to rely on the world for information a reader
develops linguistically-based semantic and syntactic

strategies which are useful in all comprehension, oral or

written
The thrust of the argument in the preceding para-

graph runs contrary to a common assumption by educationalists and psychologists that language skills are developed

independently from and prior to reading comprehension
skills.

The assumption of the preeminence of language

skills seems to be pervasive.

This is so,

I

think, be-

cause little research has been done with mature subjects

6o

who have no or possibly limited reading skills.
West,

In the

since the only subjects with limited reading skills

also are quite young, the effects are confounded with

maturational processes and general language development.
The implication derived from the assumption of the pre-

eminence of language skills--that by augmenting language
skills, reading skills can be enhanced--is acceptable.

Undoubtedly, reading comprehension increases as

language skills are enhanced.

Weaver (1977, reported in

Adams, 1977) devised a successful methodology for increasing

syntactic sensitivity on that assumption.

Third graders

were instructed individually on solving sentence anagrams.
The children were taught strategies of picking out phrases

and clauses from the scrambled words and then of arranging
them into a complete sentence.

In essence,

the children

learned to attend to word order, different parts of speech,
and the syntactic devices by which phrases and clauses
are signaled.

By-products of the tutorial sessions were

improvement on "several other" (though unspecified) tests
of reading comprehension and memory.

Were these children not confronted with the task of

solving sentence anagrams (unique to most school settings)
and assisted individually, it is plausible to assume that
the reported gains in reading comprehension and memory

would have been made over a period of time anyway.

And

6l

perhaps, say by the sixth grade, the students would
be able
to solve the sentence anagrams unassisted.

For .'Jeaver's

subjects, the linguistic strategies resulted from a

specific, planned, and guided practice with language--

sentence anagrams.

Other children who do not have

that type of practice can eventually develop the strategies
for solving anagrams, and for better reading comprehension,

by other means.

Simply because augmenting language skills

enhances reading skills, the reverse relationship is not

precluded
There is evidence of a reverse relationship which
shows that aural comprehension seems to be better in good

readers.

A study by Oaken, Weiner, and Cromer (1973)

compared aural comprehension of good readers and poor readers
at the fifth grade level.

The complete study was rather

complicated and only part of it will be described here.

Tape-recorded stories were made by good readers and poor
readers reading aloud the story passages.

Since the ex-

perimenter interrupted and corrected reading errors as
the tape was being made, each taped story differed in rate
of presentation, amount of errors, interruptions, and

corrections.

Then, both good readers and poor readers

listened to all taped stories and were tested for com-

prehension by multiple choice questions.

Listening to good

readers' taped stories, the poor readers comprehended
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approximately as well as good readers.

The good readers,

however, comprehended just as well
when listening to the
poor readers' tapes as to the good readers'
tapes.
Poor
readers, on the other hand, comprehended
much better when
listening to good readers than when listening
to the story
read by the poor readers.
The results suggest that poor

readers do not suffer from a general comprehension
deficiency when listening under ideal conditions.
Good
readers,

however, are able to make up for irregular prosodic
cues
of those who were reading the story poorly and,
through the
use of presumably linguistic strategies, to understand
the story.

Evidence, as that contributed by the Oaken, et al

study

,

makes more plausible the contention that learning

to read may provide the non-contextual practice with langu-

age necessary to develop linguistically-based comprehension

strategies.

These strategies are applicable to all language

comprehension situation--written or oral.
Perhaps my argument is one-sided because the field

study reported herein

v/as

not longitudinal and can only

demonstrate correlations between reading comprehension
skill and syllogism-solving and concomitant

prehension.

premise com-

It may never be possible to demonstrate

conclusively that the acquisition of reading skill affects
language comprehension.

Forming a control group by de-
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som6 ch.ild.F6n of fh© oppoFfunify
is unethical.

"to

l63.Fn

“to

Fes-d

One expeFimental design which could make

the causal Felationship between litenacy acquisition and

language compnehension moFe plausible is companing the

genenal language compnehension skills of noFmal FeadeFS
and dyslexic FeadeFS (not suffening fFom some otheF lin-

guistic deficiency).

OtheF useful expeFimental designs

include the one used in this study--to coFFelate penfoFmance in language compnehension with skill in Feading

compFehension among manginally litenate adults who would
have otheFwise completed the intellectual development

attFibuted to childFen.

Ideal subjects would be non-liteFate

adults tested befoFe and afteF adult liteFacy courses.
is,

It

however, most disheartening, due primarily to social

factors, that the prognosis for successful acquisition of

reading skills in adult literacy programs is poor.
Conversion

Conversion stems from the inadequate or incomplete
memory for the information presented.

Conversion occurs

when the elements and relationships which defined the

information are either missing from, mistaken, or misplaced within the memory representation.

Many constructions

are theoretically possible from one internally represented

sentence--f or example, a recall of "The cat chased the rat
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IS equivalent to the original
"It was the rat that was
chased by the cat." However, an

internally represented

sentence which has been converted
does not allow for an
equivalent construction of the original
information.

Conversion is not limited to the premises
of syllogisms,
rather it is possible in any comprehension.
It is,

however,

most evident in situations where the
deviance between input
and output is observable.
The party game,
"Gossip,"

in which each guest whispers some
statement to another in
turn until everyone has participated,
provides an opportu-

nity for an informal observation of how a
statement undergoes conversion.
There are several reasons why an original statement

may be distorted in its recall.

One prime source of

distortion is that comprehension, whether from a medium
or some other source, is always made in terms of previous

knowledge and experience.

If new information and old

knowledge are incompatible, one must be disregarded or
at least changed to conform to the other.

Smith (1975)

observed that contrary previous knowledge may cause rejection of new information.
relationship:

the more cognitive restructuring a piece

of information requires,

lieved.

Smith proposes an inverse

the less likely it is to be be-

Understanding of and memory for new information

is made in terms of previous knowledge

(Gofer, Chmielewski,
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and Brockway 1975; Dooling and
Lachman, 1971).
The
effects of previous knowledge on
comprehension of new
knowledge are not isolated to the
Third .Vorld.

It is not

unreasonable to expect that conversion
resulting from an
interference of previous knowledge is
equally prevalent
among sophisticated literates as among
Third World
villagers. Although it is working in
all comprehension,
previous knowledge as a source of conversion
is not the

primary focus in this study.
The second source of conversion is the one,

I

aver,

is responsible for the irreconcilable
differences in

syllogism performance between non-literate Third World
villagers and the literate Western urban dweller.

It is

due to lack of strategies, specifically linguistic

strategies, applicable to the task of comprehension.

This

particular type of conversion is more easily manifested in
the task of solving a syllogism, where language compre-

hension must be strict.
The syllogism is unique among most communication

settings because primarily linguistic strategies are

required to understand the syllogism premise.
or global strategies simply do not work.

Contextual

Gleaning cues

from an environment serves no purpose; neither does lis-

tening for nouns and "inventing" relationships or applying

previous knowledge.

The information which is necessary and
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sufficient for the solution is contained within
the words
alone.

Understanding the premise is possible only by a

word-by-word consideration of the non-redundant statements
of the premise.

Linguistic cues are the only viable source

for information contained in the premise,

adequate

linguistic strategies allow the individual to comprehend
the premise on the basis of the linguistic cues present.
If the linguistic strategies have not been developed

sufficiently or if they are not effective then contextual
strategies may be brought to bear, but with little more
than chance effectiveness in bringing forth an accurate

internally represented premise.

Comprehension is not

precise enough, and conversion of the premise is apparent
in the subject's performance.

Non-linguistic comprehension strategies used to

understand the premise may explain otherwise bizarre
responses made by Third

-Vorld

villagers.

Constructing

the information in the premise to conform to a socially

acceptable truth or avoiding the task of the syllogism
could be construed as the reactions of a person who,

having understood the premise, refuses to play the makebelieve game.

Or these behaviors could describe a person

who, not having understood completely the premise information,

is simply doing the best with what information he or

she did understand--embellishing the information with

6?

accepted facts or claiming that the task made "no sense."
Linguistic strategies are the sine

standing the syllogism premise.

q

ua non of under-

Scribner (1975) reported

American high school students solved 90 percent of the
valid syllogisms she presented.

Kpelle villagers could

solve only 53 percent of the same types of syllogisms.

The

literate American high school students had the linguistic

strategies necessary to understand the premise, as did
Kpelle high school students who solved 80 percent of the

syllogisms on which the villagers did so poorly.

Although

the villagers did not lack the ability to reason on their

own terms, their performance on the syllogism task per se
was inadequate because they lacked the requisite linguistic

strategies necessary to understand the syllogism.
The argument presented here contends that learning
to read for comprehension provides the experience necessary

for the development and refinement of linguistic strategies.

These are the strategies most useful for accurate compre-

hension of the premise, a prerequisite of solving syllogisms.

Thus people with better reading skills are more

able to solve syllogisms-- to understand the premise

without distortion and to reason acceptably on the infor-

mation given.

For that reason, positive correlations

between reading skill, success at solving syllogisms, and
memory for the information in the premise are expected.

CHAPTER

III

EXPERirffiNTAL DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Hypotheses
The theoretical presentation described
how the ac-

quisition of reading skills, acquired as the
beginning
reader is confronted with information that
is solely
linguistic, thereby fosters and refines linguistic

strate-

gies directed at the semantic and syntactic
cues.

These

linguistic strategies allow a more precise comprehension
of the words comprising the message.

More accurate

comprehension would then produce better performance on
syllogism tasks.
In this study, valid class-inclusion syllogisms
and

cloze reading comprehension passages were used to establish

correlations between reading comprehension skill and

performance in the syllogism task.

Although the theoreti-

cal presentation argued for causality, no practical

means presently exist to establish it.

Instead,

the

study hypothesized three probable correlations:
I.

Reading comprehension and syllogism performance
are positively related.

This is the guiding hypothesis for the entire study and

represents the performance description of the argument
made
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II.

The memory of the premise information
is

positively related to syllogism performance.
ouch a relationship is expected by proponents
of the

Conversion Hypothesis and others who argue that
memory
of the syllogism premise is the sine qua non for
solution
of the syllogism.
III.

Reading skill and memory of the syllogism
premise are directly and positively related.

The third hypothesis completes the

trilogy of relation-

ships and follows from the first two hypotheses.

Reading,

skill and syllogism performance are related, and because

memory and inference are related, reading skill and

memory must be related as well.
The data collected for these three relationships

will be re-examined in the light of possible differences
in performance resulting from elaborated information in
the premise.

A treatment of boosted premise information

was given for half the syllogisms

.

The expanded premise

provided a subject with additional linguistic information
by which to comprehend the premise more accurately.

Essentially, the intended purpose of the treatment was

prevent or lessen the degree of conversion.

Consequent

memory of the premise information and the syllogism
performance were compared between treatment and control

to
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conditions.

Subjects performing with the elaborated

premise conditions were expected to score higher on

reasoning scores and memory indicators.
Materials
o yllogisms and

treatment

.

The syllogisms used in this

study were similar in form to those used by Scribner
(

1975

)

in her Liberian studies.

Of the four forms she

used, the two of medium-level difficulty were used in

this study so that a range of performance scores would

result
The syllogisms were valid and straightforward.

The

form permits only one possible conclusion and that con-

clusion was adumbrated by the premise question.

The

two

forms were similar to the abstract skeletons:

Form A:
All A are B
No C is B

Are C then A?

Form B
Some A are B
All B are C
Are some A then C?
(Please see Appendix a for the complete set of syllogisms.)
The content of the syllogisms was concrete and

familiar;

the syllogisms described fictional characters

similar to those common in the Anancy folk tales, in-
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digeneous

to

rural Jamaican culture.

Nevertheless,

the

situations and relationships established
were not linked
to any particular story.
Conclusions could not

be drawn

from the subject's familiarity with the
folk tales.
Each form of the syllogism above had two
premise

statements:

the control statement which was,

syllogism premise statements, non-redundant

;

like most

and the treat-

ment statement which specified amplifications of
the premise information.

I'he

treatment statement sought only

to reinforce information already available and
not to

aid the subjects in arriving at the inherent relationships.

A subject was given either the control or the

treatment statement of a syllogism.

Each treatment statement consisted of three sentences.

The first sentence was the statement as used in

the control premise.

The final two statements amplified

that statement without establishing new relationships.
They were formed according to the following plan:
a)

Universal affirmative statements present in both the

A and B Form

(

"All red-bellied spiders live in mango

trees.") were first amplified by placing it in an environ-

mental context

(

"The mango tree is the home of the red-

bellied spider."); and secondly, it was amplified by an
if-then statement of the information ("If a spider has a
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red belly it lives in a mango
tree.").

B)

Particular

af f i rmatj^ statements in Form
B ("Some of Anancy’s
neighbors are black bears.") were
amplified by the same

environmental context ("Some black bears
live near to
iinancy. ); then the quantified
category was united with
other elements which could belong to
the same category
("anancy, the black bears, and the other
animals get

along together.").

C)

Treatment statements for the

Hliversal negative in Form A

(

"Bredda Thomas does not live

in a mango tree.") consisted of restating
that negative

relationship in the form of not liking whatever and
never
having done it.
("Bredda Thomas does not like
mango

trees and he has never lived in one.").

The treatment

statements for the syllogisms are in Appendix A.

Recognition qu e^stions

.

A block of nine yes-no questions

were asked after the original syllogism presentation.
Six of these questions were directed at the information
in the major premise and minor premise--three for each

premise.

(The remaining three questions,

are described shortly.)

"hook questions",

The wording of the questions was

identical for the control and treatment statements.
Three recognition questions were directed to the

major premise; three to the minor.

Of these questions

one was a restatement of the information as it was pre-
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sented; one changed the quality or quantity
of the middle
term;
ed.

one changed the nature of the relationship
establish-

However, because of the differences between
the two

forms of syllogisms (Form A contained a particular

statement,

negative,

not a

)

"some'*;

the Form B, a universal

the difficulty of the questions

between Form A and Form B was not equal.

The order of the

presentation within the block mixed questions for the
major and minor premise.

However, for the two syllogisms

of the same form, the order as well as the make-up of
the questions were similar.

Recognition questions for

each syllogism are in Appendix A.

Hook questions.

The word "hook" is inspired by the in-

terrogation technique of "fishing" in which the questioner
asks for remote information which may or may not be

known by the subject.

The hook questions restated the

syllogism question either identically to the premise
question or indirectly.

Hook questions were to elicit

reasoning, over and above the syllogism task--answering
and justifying the answer.

By restating the premise

question, hook questions allowed a performance opportunity
to show that the correct reasoning had occurred despite a

possible ineptness in explicit justification and recall
performance.

As such, hook questions, like comprehension
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questions, were implicit measures.

Recognition questions

measure implicitly represented
information-information
which may not have been reconstructed
explicitly. Hook
questions measure implicit reasoning which
would have
otherwise gone unnoticed by the demands of
the syllogism
task
Three yes-no hook questions were interspersed
with
the recognition questions, but they were
preceded by the

phrase

Do you know that..." to distinguish them from
the

recognition questions preceded by the phrase "Did

you that..."

I

tell

Phis was done to preclude fine distinctions

between actually presented information and the invited
inference.

One of the hook questions was a question of

opposite intent

(

"Do you know that Bredda Thomas is not

a red-bellied spider?") and a second question fabricated

an entirely new relationship

(

"Do you know that Bredda

Thomas is some animal that is not a red-bellied spider?").
The third question in the series, and always the last one

in the recognition block, was a statement of the premise

question

(

spider?").

"Do you know that Bredda Thomas is a red-bellied

Granted,

the questions were contrived and, at

times forced, but there were only a limited number of

ways of rephrasing a simple relationship.
for each syllogism are in Appendix A.

Hook questions
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Reading skill.

Reading skill was measured through the

cloze comprehension procedure.

Traditional cloze tests

omit every fifth word, and the task of the reader is to

supply an appropriate word.

Cloze tests assume that the

reader will "press for meaning, despite omissions in the
text" (Kaminsky, 1979).
is that a reader,

The rationale behind the cloze

if he or she understands the structure

and content of the reading passage, should be able to
utilize redundancy in the text and personal knowledge of

language to predict omitted words, represented as blank
spaces, with some degree of acceptability.

?he extent to

which the reader is able to fill in the blanks meaningfully
measures reading comprehension.
The passage used in this study was a simplified

selection from one of the more well-known Anancy folk
tales--stories of a clever spider who triumphed by
trickery, living easily off the spoils of outsmarting

others in the animal kingdom.

The passage itself was

written in standard English used in Jamaica for teaching
reading in the schools, rather than in the Jamaican
(Although the story would be told in patois,

patois.

reading patois was simply too difficult, even for Jamaican
university graduates.)

(3ee Appendix B for the intro-

duction to the cloze test, and Appendix
passage

.

C

for the cloze
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Traditional cloze procedure methodology was altered
to permit the highest response rate possible.

Requiring

the subject to fill in only every sixth word increased
the semantic base of useful information by 20 percent.
In an effort to provide

the subject with the utmost

opportunity for making meaning from the text, the beginning
sentences of the passage were written in full; furthermore,
to acquaint the subject with the nature of the task,

the

interviewer assisted the subjects in filling in the first
six blanks by showing them how their own words would fit
into the structure of the passage.

Design
A within-subjec

ts

design was used to compare and

correlate subjects' performance on syllogisms of two

different grammatical forms

(A

and B)

,

Each syllogism

form had two conditions--one control (the non-redundant
premise) and the other treatment (the elaborated premise).

Each subject answers two syllogisms of each of the two
forras--one under each condition (four syllogisms in total);

that is, on Form A of the premise, the subject responded
to a control premise statement and a treatment statement,

and repeated this same exercise for Form B of the

syllogisms
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subjects were assigned in alternating
order

one of
two groups which controlled for the
presentation order
to

effects of the elaborated or control
premise statements.
One group followed this order:
First syllogism:
Second syllogism:
third syllogism:
Fourth syllogism:

Form A, control
Form B, treatment
Form A, treatment
Form B, control

The other group followed an order switching
treatment and

control
First syllogism:
Second syllogism:
Third syllogism:
Fourth syllogism:

Form A, treatment
Form B, control
Form A, control
Form B, treatment

at the end of the experiment a cloze passage was

administered

to

all subjects.
Pr ocedures

During the introductory session with the subject,
instructions were designed

to

make the task as meaningful

as possible with as little threat as possible.

The pro-

blems were defined as being word games, and subjects were
told that the questions could be answered simply by lis-

tening to the words and thinking about them.

Instructions

emphasized that the subject did not need to know anything
about nature or to have had personal experience with the
topics of the stories; all that the subject needed to do
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was to listen carefully to the words and
think about them.
The introduction also included a practice
problem--a

three-term syllogism which was solved for the subject as
a demonstration.

The interviewer explained that the

answer could be found by putting the various words together.

The instruction sheet from which the interviewer

read is in Appendix D.
The order of the protocols in the presentation of
the syllogism was the same for each syllogism:
(1)

Interviewer read the premise or treatment condi-

tion and asked the question.
(2)

Subject answered the syllogism.

(3)

Interviewer asked why the subject gave that

answer
(4)

The subject gave the justification and the inter-

viewer jotted it down.
(5)

The interviewer asked each question in the yes-

no recognition/hook question block and the subject ans-

wered

.

(6)

Interviewer repeated the premise by saying

"Now in the beginning

I

told you that..." and asked the

subject whether or not she remembered the story.
(7)

Interviewer asked the subject to retell the

story in her own words so that the interviewer could write
it down.
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(8)

mance

)

The subject repeated the story
(recall perfor-

.

The interviewer repeated the story
to ascertain
whether that was all the subject had to
say.
(

9)

(10)

The story being completed, the
interviewer

stated the premise question and asked,

"And what did you

tell me again?"
(11)

The subject answered for the second time
the

syllogism question.
After the four syllogisms were presented in this
manner, the cloze test was administered.

The interviewer

explained the cloze procedure, read aloud the first paragraph, and helped the subject fill in the first nine

blanks to make sure that the subject understood the task.

Each subject was allotted approximately ten minutes to
complete the cloze passage.
Subjects

Subjects were 112 rural adult Jamaican women dra'^m

from two communities
by

— 4l

Amelia Williams; and

by iinatol Clark.

(s.d.=17.5)

3-nd

from White River, interviewed
7I

from Chapelton, interviewed

The mean age of the subjects was 40 5
the mean years of education (regular

primary education and JAMAL classes) was 7.13 (s.d.=2.15).
The mean cloze score was 10. 09 from 32 possible blanks;
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19 percent of the women tested filled in none of the

blanks.

A self-estimate of hours a week spent reading

yielded a mean of 2.10 (s.d.=2.7) for the whole sample,
oince the number of hours a week was a self-estimate
little experimental importance was placed on this measure.
43 percent of the sample did no
read,

reading.

Of those who

the primary source of reading material was the Bible

for 66 percent of the readers; newspapers were the primary

reading material of

I9

percent; magazines and romance

short stories accounted for the remainder.

70 percent of

the women tested from both areas were unemployed and had

been for a year.

20 percent were household workers.

The

remaining 10 percent were "higglers" (street food venders),
nurses aids, or orderlies.
economic questionnaire.)

(See Appendix E for the socio-

CHAPTER
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Data analysis

Experimental Variables and Their

IV'easureme nt

Despite numerous measurements, there were only three
classes of experimental variables:

(1)

variables repre-

senting the internal representation of the premise,

variables representing reasoning, and

(3)

senting skill in reading comprehension.

(2)

variables repreThe socio-

economic variables included age, total education, and the

self-estimate of the amount of time spent reading.
Internal representation

.

The measurement used to represent

implicit internal representation

— what

the subject "knew"

but may not have been able to verbalize--was the recogni-

tion score based on the six yes-no recognition questions.
The recognition score was obtained by subtracting half
the number of yes-no recognition questions answered in-

correctly from the number answered correctly on any particular syllogism.

Syllogisms which would have resulted in

negative scores for the recognition questions were

assigned "0"; six questions, three on each premise, yielded
a possible score of 12,

hence, the maximum score on a

set was 48.

Reasoning

.

Three indicators of reasoning were two measures
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of the syllogism performance (both at the initial pre-

sentation and the time of recall) and the performance on
the hook questions.
^he first syllogism score was a composite of the

syllogism answer and the justification given.

More weight

was given to the justification statement because another

measure, the hook score (described shortly), was designed
to measure the reasoning done without justification.

The first syllogism score was made up of two parts--points
for the syllogism answer and for the justification.

Nine

points were given for the correct syllogism answer.

The

cwo other alternatives were scores for maximum spread:
1,

if incorrect and 0, if no answer.

the justification statement.

Up to 36 points for

(The scoring scheme for the

justification statement will be described shortly.)

The

total possible score for one syllogism was 45, and for the
set of four, 180
The second syllogism score was scored in essentially
the same manner as the first syllogism score.

The last

step on the syllogism protocol was to retell the story
(the premise) and to recall the answer for the syllogism

question.

The reconstruction of the story constituted

the basis for the recall score (similar to the justifi-

cation score and dealt with shortly); the syllogism answer
recall was scored the same as the initial syllogism
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question

(9

points for a correct answer,

incorrect answer;

0

for no answer).

1

point for an

Phis answer recall

score was added to the recall score to obtain the
second
score,

•similar to the syllogism score, 45

points were possible for one syllogism and 180 for the

complete set.
The justification and the recall, albeit different

nuances of tasks, both called for the same response
the restatement of the premise.

Hence, the scoring schema

for both the justification and the recall task were identical.

The maximum possible for the perfect recall of one

premise was 18 points; degrees of conversion were scored

according to the type of error made:
(18)

Premise stated completely and correctly.

(l6)

"All" dropped as a quantifier on a universal
statement

(12)

Quantifier was converted to another specification, e.g. "some" changed to "all" or
dropped.

(10)

Premise was stated in some barely recognizable form; that is, all the elements were present, but the relationships were unclear.

(6)

another premise was present and one was
changed to factual knowledge or personal
knowledge; the factual premise was awarded
six (the other premise received whatever score
it merited)
'^hen

.

(4)

The question was used to justify the answer,
i.e. a tautology, e.g. "Is Bredda Thomas a
red-bellied spider?" "No, because Bredda
Thomas is not a red-bellied spider."
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(2)

The premise was restated diametrically
opposite to what was given, e.g. "Bredda
Thomas does not live in a mango tree."
becomes "Bredda Thomas lives in a mango
tree."

(0)

The premise was omitted (an enthymeme).

(3)

Both premises were factual knowledge or
personal knowledge or the task was avoided.
(Both were scored "0").

^he .justification score and the recall score were compiled

by adding the scores of the performance on each of the
two premises.

36 points represented perfect performance

for one syllogism.
The justification score and especially the recall

score can be thought of as measures of internal representation.

Both required the subject to express explicitly the

information in the premise.

In terms of data analysis,

however, it would be specious to correlate the justification

score with the first syllogism score or the recall score

with the second syllogism score because the scores would
be correlating with themselves.

The hook score measured reasoning on the basis of

answers to yes-no questions regarding the conclusions

possible from the premise; hence they did not require the
subject to construct whole sentences to justify answers
to the premise question.

were presented

— three

A total of five hook questions

were in the recognition block of

yes-no questions and the premise question and the recall

question were counted as well.

In order to obtain a maxi-
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mum spread in response scores,
guessing on hook questions
was penalized to a greater
extent than with the recognition score.
The number of incorrect responses
was subtracted from the number of correct
responses.
(There
was no penalty for "don’t know"
responses.) Each question
was worth two points, since a subject
could score "-10"
If all hook questions were wrong,
ten points were added
to obviate data analysis complications
of negative
scores.

A perfect hook score was 20 points,
and 80 points for the
set of four.

Cloze score._

There was no penalty for guessing in the

scoring of the cloze passage.

The response was judged

by its adequacy in the context of the passage with
no

preconceived notion of one correct word.

Also, lexical

and syntactical irregularities of the Jamaican patois were

allowed as long as the response was consistent with the
patois itself.
account.

Spelling errors were not taken into

There was a total of thirty-two blocks possible

for the cloze score.

Some subjects could not fill in the cloze passage

because they had poor eyesight and did not have their
glasses with them at the time of the interview.

approximated cloze score for these individuals

An
(a total of

eight subjects) was computed by interpolating from the
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highest and second highest correlating
experimental
variables--the hook score and the recognition

score.

General Performance
The averages --mean, standard deviation
(s.d.),

median, and mode--obtained for each of the
experimental

variables are presented in Table
sented in three divisions--first

1.

,

The scores are pre-

for the total sample of

112 subjects and then divided by interviewer:
(4l subjects) and Anatol

Table

2

Amelia

(?1 subjects).

presents averages obtained for the socio-

economic data obtained on each subject.

The same sub-

divisions are made.
Analysis of Effects
The effects on the data of several controlled and

uncontrolled variables are analyzed at the outset so that
the subsequent correlations which are to substantiate the

hypothesis may be viewed with greater perspective.

The

most significant differences were found between interviewers; other data effects were attributable to practice.
The

treatment condition and the form of the syllogism

yielded inconsistent results.

The data for the corre-

lations of the major experimental variables is organized
to minimize

the influence of these effects.

o
b

>
P

c+

O
!-

(D

o
tsi

O
rf

P

M H"
M
P

fD

Oj

3

(Ju

o
o
P

X

'X

O
o

h-*

> >

t-9

^

p P o
d P c+ 0.
ct CD P O
o M (- O
M P
P Oj (D
P
3

"d

PJ

0)

P

> P

P3

P
o
O

P P o cn^
P P CT P
c+ P P HO 1-' M

M

<rt-

H-

I-'

P

M

O
P P
3
X C/J
MO
P O
P
P
Oj

00

>>

P P
P p
c+ P
O M

p
o
MO
o p
<7+ a
P

MMP M '<MOj
P M
3 O
X 0^
M H*
C/J

Pj

P
P M W
P P O clP P c+
c+ P P 0
O M M'c;

.

MMP MM
0.

P O
3 on
pj P*
MM
P 3

P P
3

MM

h->

-v3
f\)

-Pm

MM

rv3

M
Pm
MMW

-v3

c

p
p

H*

P
O'

M
P

0.

o
o
p
p

Oj

o
o
p
p

h->

1

H*

M

^
PM
MM

r\)

M

-o

PMtP

MM

Average

P
O

Scores
1
,

Pi
iC/3

W

for

TABLE

VO

M !t-*

O

ro ONt--

MOx
-P^ 00

CO

tv)

ro

Q\j\CO

PO P

M M
M VO M

-v3

VO VO ro

VP-0 VP

•

•

VviUJ

•

M

•

O

P OV

•

•

00-0

s
p

1

p
p
Experimental

I-*

03

U)

O VO
OO

M !- M
M M ro
vv\U\ o

MMM
OMM
MM

--<}

PPP

VP
VO VO
•

•

•

PM M

VP rpvp
OvvO Ov
•

•

«

M VO O

U1
•

D
Variables

M

M

O

O -v3

vO

VO VjJU\

M

OOO

0\ -PO^
00 ov

ON

O

Ov

VjJ

ro ro

r\)

ovvo

•

-v3

ov 03 00

<03 r\3 ^3
VjJ ~0 -n3

M

rovo ^3
Vjv PVjJ
•

00

-nJ

M

M

OV p
P VP
fv3

!\)

M VP O

S
p
X

•

H*

OV

P
P

-o

VP

P Ov

M VP

OvO

Ov

s
o
o.
a
0)

Z8

O
Hj

Hi

p

O

P

MP
T O P. M
P <r+ C
P P O (-<
I— h-* p ro
H'
cf P
P C/J H- Hj
p:

Anatol

Oj S.
'p p

Cf^

c+

-

5^6
P P

c+

P p

C+

O

'

h-* h-'

p
p
c+

O
h->

P

Pop
3 D

>

u.

O
P p

C+

M

<ri-

M
M

I— CD

P

p

Oj

p
3

«
p

M
p

p p
P fv

p

K

c

p
p

p O
p, C

H-

PM

o'

p.

p

at)

p

Average

Scores

M

h-* fV)

^
M

O

-P^h->

P

fV)

I— H'

fvO

for

IC/J

M

-v0 -n3
•

•

)0

rv

-O
•

(-

M ^o
O UJ M
r\)

•

•

U)

-p^

\0

fV)

o

ro

r\j

•

•

•

•

•

OOU^

o

•

I-'

rv>

M

h-'

!-

-P
ro

M

CN^O -o

•

Socio-economic

Oi
rv)
•

VjJ jNj
•

•

0\ 0 -n3

'oJ -{^

p
P
P

D
Variables

U)
-SJ-s3 -n3
•

•

0D\0

•

-X)
•

CX>

Xj

00 00 00

VO

M

-p:-U)

MOM

ro

M

-n3

•

•

o

•

CX)

O VO O

P
P

ooo

o

f\J fV)

OO

•

•

P
H-

p
p

88

89

Interviewer effects.

There were large unexpected differ-

ences between the subjects tested by each of the inter-

viewers.

Ideally both interviewers would have worked in

the same areas on the same days

.

Control of this facet

of the experiment was lost due to political violence in

Jamaica at the time of the field work.

In order to ensure

their safety, the interviewers worked in their respective

hometowns where they were known and trusted.
The experimental variables showed the largest differ-

ences in performance--the first syllogism score, t(110)=
-3

.
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p=.001; the second syllogism score,

,

p=.018; the recognition score,

hook score,

t

(

110 )=-3 18
.

,

t (110

p=.002.

)

t

(

110 =-2 39
)

=-2 55, p=.012;
.

,

the

All of these differ-

ences showed marked superiority in subjects tested by

Anatol in Chapelton, the larger, more developed town.
Socioeconomic variables tested showed almost no differences between the interviewers' sub jects--total education
(

t

110 ) =- .41

,

p=.684), self-estimate of the amount of

time spent reading per week
(

t (110

)

=1 09

»

p=.2?7.

(

t (110

)

=- 2?
.

.

p=.?85i or age

A chi square analysis revealed no

differences between the occupations of the subject
(x^(4o=6.65. p=.156).

Suprisingly, the clcse scores did not test signi-

ficantly different either (t(110=1.39» p=.l68).

In fact,

the higher scoring tended, albeit not at all significantly.
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toward Amelia, who interviewed in a
small village in
primarily sugar cane growing country near
the North Coast
tourist area. The possibility of interviewer
differences
in the allotment of time for the cloze
reading test (10

minutes was to be allowed) was tested by
counting responses
made only on the first half of the cloze test.
Chere was

no significant change in the trend, so time
alloted was

probably not a factor.

Moreover, of the total number of

blanks filled in by a subject, Amelia's subjects
answered
a marginally higher percentage of blanks
correctly--68

percent vis a vis 58.6 percent for

.

Anatol.

It is not clear whether differences between inter-

viewer's techniques or personalities and/or unmeasured
differences between the communities account for the
differences in syllogism performance.

Although the two

interviewers' subjects did not differ significantly in
any of the socioeconomic data collected (age, education,
occupation, a self-estimate of hours a week spent reading)
the hometowns were located in two different areas in the

island.

Amelia's hometown, White River, was smaller

(less than 500 population) and separated from the popular

Ocho Rios tourist area by poor roads and hills.

Anatol

's

hometown, although more isolated in the center of the
island, was larger (more than 10,000 inhabitants) and was
the commercial center for several sugar estates.

Un-
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measured were variables of informal
participation in
economic and social activity.
^irnella was an agricultural development
worker with

the Ministry of Agriculture.

Her normal speech had a

monotone quality and was accompanied with an
undemonstrative demeanor.

Anatol, on the other hand, was a former

elementary school teacher studying to be a social worker,
ohe was the far more animated of the two--both
because of

her background and because of her interest in the study.
One indication that hnatol's presentations were more

informative to her subjects is the fact that only
35 percent of her subjects' justifications were classified as
inadequate responses

— refusing

the task or importing

outside evidence for justification; on the other hand,

Amelia's subjects responded inadequately
cation 62 percent of the time.
dii'f'e^rences

on the justifi-

This possibility of

in task delivery and the consequent information

available to the subject is addressed again in the following section.
The effect of the treatment

.

The treatment of the re-

dundant premise had a mixed effect on boosting perfor-

Amelia's group showed

mance.

a barely significant effect

on the first syllogism score, t(4o)=-2.l4, p=.039» and

anatol

's

group showed none.
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Although the total group sample yielded significant
differences between recognition score performance on
treatment and control conditions

(

t

(

111 =- 2 30
)

.

,

p

=

.024)

neither of the interviewers, when analyzed separately,
showed significant differences
p=.113» Anatol:

(Amelia:

t(4o) = -1.53,

t(70)=-1.69, p=.095).

The treatment condition had little effect on the hook

score

(t

(lll)=-1.23» p=.233 for the whole group).

The

resistance of the hook score (implicit reasoning) to the
influence of the treatment which did affect the recognition score (implicit internal representation) is a little

surprising.
Part of what could have accounted for both the tre-

mendous differences in syllogism scores between the inter-

viewers and the lack of treatment-induced improvement in
anatol

's

syllogism scores is the difference between the

interviewers’ deliveries in the syllogism presentations.
If the actual presentations of

matol

in the experimental

situation were more animated than they were in the inter-

viewer training sessions, the cues available from prosody
and stress, even when the non-redundant control form of
the premise was repeated only twice, may have been adequate
to comprehend the premise accurately.

The additional

restatements were unnecessary for comprehension.

Phis

explanation would account for the performance differences
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between subjects of iirnella and Anatol:

the greater

resistance toward the justification task by Amelia's
subjects, and the undifferentiated performance of Anatol

's

subjects between the control and treatment conditions.

Explanations based on differences in linguistic sophisitication due to urbanization would only account for differences between total scores--the treatment still should have

been effective.
The effect of the form

(Form A (All-no)
trees.

The two forms of the syllogism

"All red-bellied spiders live in mango

;

Bredda Thomas does not live in a mango tree"; and

Form B (oome-all)
bears.

.

:

"Some of Anancy’s neighbors are black

All black bears eat berries.") have been ranked

as medium in difficulty by several experimenters
son,

1974; Scribner, 1975)-

(Erick-

Form A, which ranked fifth

out of 19 valid syllogisms tested by Erickson was solved

correctly more consistently than
eleventh.

Form

B,

which ranked

Comparisons between the first syllogism scores

of each form and further between the second syllogism

scores of each form did not yield any significant difference
in the difficulty of one form over another.

The recognition score demonstrated quite handily
to
that the yes-no questions for Form A were easier

answer than Form B:

t(lll)=6.12, p = .001.

Phis rather
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cautious interpretation is made in view
of the difference in the nature of the recognition
questions directed at Form A and Form B.
Both syllogism forms contained
a universal affirmative statement
("All red-bellied

spiders live in mango trees" and "All black
bears eat
berries.")

The recognition questions for these state-

ments were similar.

Form A's minor premise was a uni-

versal negative statement:
in mango trees."
(1)

"Bredda Thomas does not live

The recognition questions were:

Does Bredda Thomas live someplace that is not
a mango tree?

(2)

Did

I

say that Bredda Thomas lives in a mango

tree?
(

3

)

Did

I

say that Bredda Thomas lives in a coco-

nut tree?
The major premise in Form B, a particular affirmative

statement,

("Some of Anancy's neighbors are black bears.")

had recognition questions which could have been more con-

fusing

.

(1)

Did

I

say that some of Anancy's neighbors are

black bears?
(2)

Did

I

say that all of Anancy's neighbors are

black bears?
(

3

)

Do you think that not one of Anancy's neighbors

are black bears?
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The

some" statement allowed more direct questions
to pin-

point its qualification.

"All" and "some" could be more

readily confused than the opposites of "does" and
"does
"
not
.

The hook score, however, showed a trend in the

opposite direction.

Hook scores for Form B were signifi-

cantly higher than for Form

A;

t (ill

)

=-2 52
.

,

p=. 013

.

However, when broken down by interviewer, only Amelia

showed a significant difference in hook score:
2 . 36

,

p=.023; Anatol did not;

t( 4 o)=

t(70)=-1.42, p=.l 6 o.

The

superiority of Form B is discrepant with results obtained
by previous experimenters

(Srickson, 19?4; Scribner, 1975 ).

It may be due to the design of the experiment and is

explained in the following section.
Phe effect of be tween-syllogism practice

.

The general

effect of practice with the information in the premise
and with the requirements of the task was evident at
two places in the experiment

— between

the syllogisms

(the

performance on the last syllogism was superior to the first

syllogism as the subject "caught on" to the nature of the
task) and within the syllogism task itself (between the

first syllogism answer with the justification and the

recall with the second syllogism answer)

.

The between-

syllogism improvement is considered in this section; the
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within-syllogism improvement, in the
following section.
In order to look for the
effects of

practice alone

(irrespective of control or treatment
condition) only
syllogisms of the same form were compared
by virtue of
their order of occurrence.
In other words, Form A was

presented in the first and third slots—
with the treatment preceding the control for one
experimental
group,

and in the opposite order for the second
experimental
group.

(Subjects were assigned to one or the other

experimental group in alternating order, so each
inter-

viewer had equal numbers in both groups.
terviewer is not a confounding factor.

Thus the in-

Form B was pre-

sented switching control and treatment orders by experimental groups in the second and fourth slots.

The two

Form A's were compared for the effects of order (irres-

pective of condition) as were the two Form B's.
The results are very interesting.

syllogism improvement was done on Form
the first and third slots.

The major be tweenA,

which occupied

Three of the four syllogism

measurements showed improvement; the first syllogism
score: t (ill =- 3 06
)

t

(ill ) =-4 15

p=.000.

,

.

,

p=. 003

;

the second syllogism score;

p=.000; and the hook score:

t

(lll)=-3.64,

The improvement was consistent between subjects

of Hrnella and Anatol on the second syllogism score and the
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hook score,- the exception was
the first syllogism score,
in which only amelia’s
subjects showed improvement
(tC4o)=-2,99. P=.005) on Form a.
Interestingly, there
was no improvement for the
recognition score for Form A,
for the total sample or by
Interviewer.

On Form B which was presented
in the second and
fourth slots, the order of
presentation was quite muted.
In fact, the only score to show
significant differences
was the second syllogism score
(t(lll)=-2.87,
p=. 005 )

which when separated by interviewer
almost slipped from
significance (Amelia:
t(4o)=-2.10,
= .o42
p

and Anatol:

t(70)=-2.12, p=.037).
The unexpectedly inferior performance
on Form A in

relation to Form B which noted earlier can be
explained
by the design of the experiment.

Treatment and control

conditions were balanced and so were the two premise
stories (each of the four syllogisms had a control premise and a treatment premise which yielded eight separate

syllogism premise stories).

Form A always occupied the

first and third slot and Form B, the second and fourth.
To control for the order in which the forms were presented

would have required two more groups.

Since measurement of

performance on the form of the syllogism was not an issue
in the experiment, and since counterbalancing for the

effects would have doubled the experimental groups and the
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necessary subjects, the order of presentation of the
form
was left uncontrolled.
The differences in success at solving the two forms

between this experiment and others done previously is now
easily explained.

The marked improvement in Form A due

to the order of presentation meant that on the presenta-

tion of the first syllogism subjects were at a loss about

what was expected and hence their performance was at its
worst.

Form B syllogism showed little or no improvement

in any of the measures.

Hence, by the presentation of the

second syllogism the subject had more or less "caught on"
to what was expected.

Because one of the Form A syllogisms

was always in the first slot, composite performance for the
two Form A syllogisms suffered.

Since all other aspects

of the design were balanced, comparison of the forms

would be the only variable likely to be affected by the
design.
It is interesting to note that the recognition score

did not improve with practice in either form.

Apparently,

the ability to answer straight forward yes-no questions

on information had been developed to the point where the

opportunity for practice within the protocol of the
experiment (four trials) was too short to show improvement

.
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of within-syllogism practice

The recall

.

portion of the second syllogism task was a second
opportunity for the subject to construct the information in the

premise

— the

justification was the first.

The justifi-

cation and recall scores comprised 80 percent of the first
and second syllogism scores (36 points out of a possible

45 for the syllogism score).

Although the justification

and recall elicited the same response, the observed

differences in performance were the largest effects

manifest in the study:

justification-recall differences

for the whole sample, t(lll)=-l8.01, p=.000; for Amelia:

t(40)=-9.98, p=.000; and for Anatol:
p= .000

t (?0

)

=-15 26
.

.

Two factors could account for this effect.

The

first is the additional practice with the information
in the premise before the recall task.

By answering the

series of 6 yes-no recognition questions, the subject

could have inadvertently rehearsed the information in
the premise.

Furthermore, to obviate the possibility

that no-answered questions would act as distractors, the

interviewer read the non-redundant premise form once more
before the recall and the final syllogism question.
Hence the subject had an additional opportunity to listen
to the premise.

As a result,

the subject had one more work

with the information between the first and second syllogism
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performance opportunities.
The other factor which could account for
the dis-

parity in the scores was the differences in
the task requirements. Essentially the justification and

the recall

elicit the same response

— reconstruction

of the premise,

but the tasks are quite different— the
justification re-

quires answering the question,

"Why do you say that?" to

whatever answer the subject had given to the premise
question; the recall asked the subject to,
the story in your own words so that

I

"...tell me

can write it down."

The large effects observed are probably attributable to

both practice and task factors.
A closer look at the differences between the first and

second syllogism performance reveals the source of the
differences.

inadequate

j

They are in part attributable to numerous

ustifications--answering the premise question,

"Why do you say that?" by avoiding the task or by import-

ing outside evidence.

These responses were scored as "0"

out of a possible 36 points for the justification.

There

were a total of 448 syllogism trials--112 subjects doing
four syllogisms apiece; of the 448 trials, on 201 trials
just under half, the subjects avoided the justification

task or imported outside evidence.

On the other hand,

there were only 34 instances of avoidance or importing
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outside evidence on the later recall task.

In all but

3^ of the 201 cases, some recall was made
of the premise.

The subject, of course, received points
for the degree

of correctness of the recall performance.

On that basis

along the scores would be very different.

Still it is not

clear whether the performance differences are due
to

within-syllogism practice or to task variations.
another point of note is that in one third of the 201
cases of avoiding or distorting the justification task,
at least two out of the three recognition questions for
one premise were answered correctly.

In other words,

in one out of three cases of inadequate responses on the

syllogism task, the subject "knew" enough about one
premise to answer two out of the three comprehension
questions for that premise correctly.

The subjects seem

to have been persistently confused about the requirements

of the syllogism justification.

Floor effects plagued the first syllogism score and

ceiling effects, the second syllogism scores.

The floor

effects were brought about because quite a variety of

responses--outright avoidance of the task resorting to
personal experience, or importation of evidence--were
scored as "0".

The ceiling effect in the second syllogism

score could have been alleviated by the incorporation of
more difficult forms of valid syllogisms.
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The preceding section which looked
at the various
effects in the data did so by using t-test
after t-test-each of the four experimental variables was
compared for
the effects of interviewer, condition,

form, and order.

There is, of course, a certain danger in running
a great
number of t-tests on different effects for one
variable.

Significances due to chance alone are more likely to
become
manifest as the numbers of the tests increase. For that
reason, marginally significant differences were inter-

preted with some caution because not all apparent significances reported may have validity.
analysis of

Correlations

In order to obtain data least affected by inter-

vening variables for the correlations in support of the
hypotheses, two modifications in the data analysis are
made.

First, the differences in overall performance be-

tween the subjects of the two interviewers are delineated
by analyzing the experimental data separately for each

interviewer.

Secondly, since the data in support of

differences between conditions--control and treatment--were
equivocal, control and treatment scores are combined.

Thus

a subject's first syllogism score, second syllogism score,

recognition score, and hook score include scores for both
conditions.

The procedure of combining all scores balanced
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the differences due to form and order of
presentation
as well.

Essentially, all three hypotheses regarding the

positive correlations between reading skill, success
at
solving syllogisms, and memory for the premise
information
were supported.
The first and third hypothese

(

(I)

Reading compre-

hension and syllogism performance are positively related,
and (III) Reading comprehension and memory of the syllogism

premise are positively related) are supported by the use
of linear regressions correlating the four major experi-

mental variables--the first syllogism score, the second

syllogism score, the hook score (for the first hypothesis)
and the recognition score (for the third hypothesis -)

with the performance on the cloze procedure.

A step-wise

regression was performed so that the effects of the socioeconomic variables

— the

total years of education, the

self-estimated amount of time spent reading per week, and
age

— that

might influence the equation could be explored.

In all cases,

the cloze score was the first variable

entered by the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

computer program (meaning that of the four--the cloze
score, education, amount of reading, and age--the cloze

score had the strongest correlation).

Other variables

entered after the cloze score did not significantly change

1C4

the multiple correlation; that is,
the addition of the

other scores did not increase significantly
the predictability of the equation over and above

the cloze score.

This was due in part to the confounding
inter-correlation
between cloze score and total education
(arnella:

p-.OOO; anatol:

r=.348,

r=.368, p=.000) and between cloze score

and amount of hours a week spent reading
(Amelia: r=,487,
p=.000; matol:

r=.296, p=.000).

Still, the cloze score

was the single best predictor of the first
syllogism score,
the second syllogism score, the recognition score,
and
the hook score.

There were discrepancies between the correlations for
the linear regressions obtained for

Amelia and

Anatol.

The correlations with the cloze score were much higher
for Amelia, who tested in the smaller town.

The cloze

score explained 52.6 percent of the variance on the

syllogism score for Amelia’s group (F(l 39 =43 2?
)

,

.

,

p=.000),

as contrasted with 23.9 percent for Anatol (F(1,69)=21.67,

p=.000).

The other scores followed suit--the cloze score

usually accounting for at least twice as much variance
for

Amelia than

for Anatol:

53*6 percent of the variance

on the second syllogism score for Amelia (F (1 39 =44 97
)

p=.000) as contrasted with 26 percent for
(

F(l 69 =24 24
)

.

,

,

ilnatol

p=.000)i 44.5 percent of the variance for

the hook score for arnella (F( 1 39 =31 28
)

,

•

,

p=.000);
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16.4 percent for Anatol (F(l,69)=13.48,
p=.000) and

45.9 percent of the variance on the recognition
score for
Hrnella (F (1 39)=33 15. p=.000); 33-9 percent of
,

the

.

variance for Anatol (F(l,69)=35.42, p=.000).

Despite the

great differences in the percentages of variance
accounted
for,

for subjects of both interviewers, the cloze score

was always significant and consistently the strongest

correlation among the socioeconomic variables entered.
The first and third hypotheses--that reading skill

would correlate positively with

(l)

syllogism performance

and (2) memory for the syllogism were substantiated by

results from both interviewers despite the significant

discrepancy in the scores between the two interviewers.
The second hypothesis dealt with the relationship

between the memory for the premise and syllogism performance.

Correlations between the recognition score with

the first and the second syllogism scores and the hook

score were significant (p=.000), positive, and quite high

with little difference between Amelia and Anatol.

The

similarity in the strength of correlations with the recog-

nition score for all three scores is striking--for the
first syllogism score (Amelia:

r=.686, p=.000; Anatol

r=.644, p=.000); the second syllogism score (Amelia:
r=.609, p=.000; Anatol r=.6?4, p=.000); for the hook score

(Amelia:

r=.6l2, p=.000; Anatol:

r=.632, p=.000).
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These high correlations support
the notion that performance on the syllogism task is
related to an accurate

internally represented premise
information.

The high

correlation held for both the explicit
syllogism task
including restatement of the premise
in the justification
or recall and the implicit reasoning
measure, the hook
score
^ LjPPl^^ntal

analyses

.

A conjecture was made in the

Chapter II that subjects responding to the
syllogism

question by avoiding the task or by importing
evidence

would convert the premises because they did not have
linguistic strategies to understand them.

The

argument predicted that the reading ability of these
subjects would be lower.

An examination of the instances

in which subjects avoided the syllogism task supported

this argument.

Of the 448 cases,

in 201 cases the subjects

avoided the task or imported evidence.

The cloze score

for this group of 201 cases was compared with the cloze

scores for the 24 ? remaining cases that did not avoid the

syllogism task.

The difference was significant

(

t

(

446

)

6 71
.

p=.000); the mean cloze score for the subjects in avoidance
or importation of evidence was 7.08;

the mean cloze score

for the remainder who justified in some reasonable

fashion, was 12 53
.

*

(The mean cloze score for the entire

,
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sample is 10.09.)

Even more striking was the comparison between subjects
who performed inadequately on the recall task and
those

who did not.

Despite the marked improvement between

justification and recall scores; still there were 34 cases
in which subjects for the recall task avoided the task
or imported outside evidence.

The subjects comprising the

34 cases had a mean cloze score of 2.?; the mean cloze

score for the entire sample was 10.09.

The groups were

significantly different, but because the numbers of cases
in the two groups were so different (34 versus 4l4) the

SPoo separate variance estimate was used
p= 000
.

(

t (64 15)
.

9 69
.

,

)

Cloze scores were significantly lower for the cases of

subjects who avoided the syllogism task or imported outside evidence.

Because the data used for these analyses

represent the cases of four repeated measures on each
subject, it is conceivable that a single subject could
be represented in both groups.

Interpretation from this

data must be tempered; still the significances are quite
high.
The Role of Schooling
It was impossible to abstract the role of schooling

by correlational analysis because 75 percent of the sample
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had completed from seven to nine
years of schooling.

Considering the average age of the
subjects.

(4o.5 years),

this meant that quite a wide-spread
rural educational

system was in existence a quarter of a
century previous.
The restricted range of schooling bode
ill for correlations
with the major experimental variables—
only two were barely
significant (for Amelia, the first solution score,
r=.366,

p =.079 and the second solution score, r=.359, p=.021).

Unfortunately, no conclusions can be drawn from such

uniform data.
Summary

.

The lower correlations of all of Anatol’s experi-

mental variables with the cloze score (thus accounting
less for the variability in performance) is likely due to
the probable difference in the presentation of the task.

The prosody and gesticulation in Anatol's task presenta-

tion probably made available marginally more information

useful to all her subjects irrespective of reading
ability.

Thus the cloze score was inferior as a predictor

of syllogism performance when compared with performances
by Amelia's subjects,

xlnatol's task presentation pro-

bably also accounted for the ineffectiveness of the

treatment form of the syllogism premise among her subjects.
Apparently, control condition subjects were able to glean
enough information from the prosody and gesticulation of
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the presentation to comprehend
the premise about as well
as subjects who heard the
elaborated treatment premise.
On the other hand, arnella's
subjects who may have
lacked the cues from prosody and
gesticulation had to

rely on semantic and syntactic cues
for comprehension.
The cloze score was hence a better
predictor because
strategies utilizing semantic and syntactic
cues are

developed during reading acquisition.

consistent with Oaken, et al.

These results are

(1973) who demonstrated

good readers were superior in listening
comprehension when
the oral presentations were deficient in
prosodic
cues.

Furthermore, the probable lack of prosody and gesticulation in the presentation made the additional information
in the treatment condition significant in the syllogism

performance for Amelia's group.
Additionally, the effects of the cultural demands
on language usage in a commercial community could explain

why the cloze score accounted for less variability in the

performance of Anatol's subjects.

The commercial mileau

demanded a more precise comprehension and usage of language
on the part of all inhabitants.

The practice with langu-

age fostered by the cultural mileau affected the perfor-

mance on the syllogism task creating lower correlations

with the single measurement of the cloze score.
One interesting characteristic of Anatol's correla-

110

tions is worthy of note.

Some subjects with low cloze

scores (4 points or below--mean=9 20

)

performed above aver-

age on the syllogism task (better than
73 point).

In

other words, among 26 subjects with low cloze scores,

although the majority performed below average on the experimental tasks, 4 performed above average.

On the other

hand, subjects with high cloze scores tended to do well

on the experimental task almost without exception

.

The

same pattern emerged on the second syllogism score with
8

of the low cloze score subjects performing above the

group average.

Not being able to read well did not pre-

clude a subject from doing well on the syllogism task;

being able to read well did mean high performance on the

syllogism task.

CHAPTER

V

DISCUSSION
Summary and Conclusions
The difficulties in the interpretation
of the data--

not being able to infer the extent to
which the differences
found in the two groups were due to
differences in cultural
mileau or differences in presentation of the
syllogism

task--permit only cautious conjectures in regard
to

possible cause-and-effect relationships between
reading

comprehension and skill at solving syllogisms.

The

correlations were positive, as predicted, and were consistent between the interviewers even though the strength
of the correlation varied.

Correlations of the first

syllogism score and the second syllogism score with cloze
score support the contention of the overall effect of the

acquisition of literacy skills on syllogism performance.
In this particular task,

the subjects were called upon

to verbalize the substance of their reasoning and to

express explicitly their recall of the syllogism.

Read-

ing comprehension also correlated positively with the

components of syllogism solving

— understanding

the premise

(the recognition score) and reasoning done without the

burden of explicit justification (the hook score).

These

consistent positive relationships warrant consideration of
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a causal relationship between
the acquisition of literacy
and the comprehension of language
required on a syllogism

task.

Chapter II made a theoretical argument
of how the acquisition of reading skills results in better
comprehension of language as measurable by the task
of solving
syllogisms.

First, rational links were made between the

task of solving syllogisms and the integral
process of

language comprehension based on the words-as -given.

The

point was established that the sine qua non of solving a

^yll^si^^ is understanding the premise accurately.

In

support of this, cross-cultural studies were examined

which showed that not understanding the premise seemed to
be the non-literate Third World villagers

blem

'

greatest pro-

.

Oral language comprehension was conceptualized as being
a product of the interaction of two types of cognitive

strategies

contextual strategies which take into account

cues from the environmental situation, including prosody

and gesticulation, and linguistic strategies which are

directed to semantic and syntactic cues of the language.
The development of language comprehension in children

was examined to support the contention that contextual

strategies are developed first and are quite persistant
throughout life.

Studies of communication patterns in
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non-literate cultures demonstrated that in these settings

with a high degree of shared assumptions, contextual
strategies may play a predominant role in comprehension.
The lack of contextual cues in a communication sit-

uation is likely to enhance the development or refinement
of linguistic strategies for language comprehension.

The

acquisition of the skill of reading was suggested as ideal
practice in comprehension of language which provides few
contextual cues which are not a part of the written text.
Other factors, such as the cultural demands for precise

meaning in language, may also act to develop and refine
linguistic strategies.

These linguistic strategies are

then useful in all language comprehension situations-oral as well as written.
In the particular task used in this experiment,

solving and justifying valid class inclusion syllogisms,

linguistic strategies provide the basis for the accurate

understanding of the premise which allows correct solutions of syllogisms

.

In the light of the requirements of

the syllogism task, conversion was re-examined on its role
in syllogism performance and language comprehension in

general.

The absence or inadequacies of linguistic

strategies were cited as one of the prime contributors to

conversion in comprehension and inadequate performance.
The theory was presented as the study's justification
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and rationalization of the
effects of the acquisition
of
reading.
Because this study was exploratory
and sought
to unite the acquisition of
literacy, comprehension of
language, and syllogism performance
only in the broadest
terms, the theoretical justification
made linkages which
were only reasoned and not themselves
the subject of
empirical evidence. The concept of
strategies was a

fictional convenience denoting an
interaction of the
processes of attention and memory. Moreover,
throughout
the presentation only semantic and
syntactic cues^were
spoken of as the complete source of information
in written
language.
Given the present state of knowledge,
it is

possible that other cues may be available in
written language.

The data, as analyzed, is consistent with the theory

but differences between the subjects of the interviewers
left unresolved the extent of influence of the presentation
of the interviewer and the role of cultural demands for

precise meaning in language.

Anatol's subjects performed

uniformly better on the syllogism tasks than

Amelia’s

subjects even though there was no difference in the cloze

performance.

It is likely that there was more non-

linguistic information in Anatol's presentations.

More-

over, Anatol interviewed in a larger town with more

commercial activity.

The differences between the cultural
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importance of information as determined
by economic and
social factors probably contributed
to how well the subjects
were able to deal with language per se,
thus accounting
for some of the differences between
Amelia and Anatol.

Attributing some of the differences between
the
subjects of the interviewers to cultural mileau

is a con-

sistent extension of previous research reported
in Greenfield ( 1972 ) which was done by Cole, Gay, and Glick.

They

showed that even non-literate members of literate
societies
(in this case,

the

Vai of Liberia who have long had a

script for their language) could describe to a listener

unseen stimulus material more effectively than their oral
tradition society Kpelle counterparts could,

(As might

have been expected, literate Vai did better than non-

literate

Vai (bcribner and Cole, 1978).)

Research such

as this highlights the influence of culture on language

usage and hints at the role that a written language and

literacy may play.
Any assertions of the causal relationships should be

tempered by the recognition that the acquisition of

reading skill is not the only cause which may result in
better comprehension in language.

Literacy acquisition

is not the sole contributor to semantic and syntactic

strategies of language comprehension (and hence to ability
to understand syllogisms), but in the broadest interpre-
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tation, the results of this study coupled
with the thrust
of the theory presented, the acquisition of
literacy in

all probability helps to foster development of
semantic

and syntactic strategies which in turn enable better
overall language comprehension and better performance on the

syllogism task.
Implications for Future Research
It is among the easier tasks for an experimenter to

recommend further research in the area of a recently
completed study, especially when collecting sufficient
data to demonstrate empirically each of the links in the

theoretical framework presented would require extensive

further research.

Were this particular type of experi-

ment to be repeated,

I

would recommend the use of one

interviewer working in several socioeconomic settings
because different interviewers, no matter how well rehearsed, can bring about differences in responses.

Several settings with economic differences would be in-

structive because the cultural demands on communication
may affect language comprehension and hence syllogism

performance and possibly could be isolated more readily

with a single interviewer.

Ideally, of course, the subjects

would be chosen to have a range of educational backgrounds
and reading comprehension scores.

In samples chosen

117

randomly from a community, ideal
distributions are rarely
attained. Even given an ideal
range of subjects,

it would

probably be impossible to separate
statistically the
effects due to acquisition of
literacy from the

effects
of schooling beyond the acquisition
of literacy.
Schooling effects beyond the acquisition
of literacy would include the acquisition of numeracy or
the demands for oral
expression or explanation which the teacher
placed on the

student
The treatment, the recognition questions,
and the hook

questions were useful instruments to measure different
aspects of syllogism performance although they
were probably imperfect measures influenced by the
presentation
of the interviewer.

The treatment seems especially liable

to differences in presentations of the syllogism task.

If

the recall task were changed to a true second attempt at
the syllogism

— not

asking the subject to repeat the story

but to state again why exactly the subject answered the way
he or she did

— stronger

conclusions could be drawn about

the affect of practice with the information.

The use of a

multiple-choice cloze procedure instead of one in which a
subject has to fill in the blanks might result in a

smoother distribution of cloze scores and hence stronger
correlations with other experimental and socioeconomic

variables
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Research conducted with pre-literate and
semi-literate
subjects may, in time, add credance to the contention
that

reading acquision does have an impact on language
comprehension.

Language comprehension studies, per se, have

not been done in cross-cultural settings.

Perhaps when

results from language comprehension studies are combined

with the results from tangentially related tasks, such as

solving syllogisms or Piaget's conservation tasks, and

placed in a context of economic development, schooling,
and the acquisition of literacy, their influence on "human

thinking" will become more apparent.
Implications to Education
In conclusion, an important recommendation for

educational policy decisions can be derived from this
study.

The basis for the recommendation is drawn from

two sources.

First, the positive correlations between

reading comprehension skill and language comprehension
which were established in the data analysis are considered
to substantiate the theoretical contention that the ac-

quisition of literacy resulted in better language comprehension.

The experimental design could not support this

contention conclusively--the effect of the acquisition of
literacy on language comprehension is assumed for the sake
of this argument.

Secondly, several suppositions regard-

119

ing the interrelationships between
language, knowledge,
and economic development are made and
discussed briefly.
Given the assumptions and the line of reasoning,
the

implications of this study to the field of
education can
be made
Any medium (denotation systems of elements
and rules)

language, time, measurements, mathematics, even
music-is a carrier of information;

the more articulated the ele-

ments, the more precise the medium can be in description.
A sub-set of the information which a medium can depict
is knowledge.

Knowledge is information about events,

relationships, procedures; in cultures steeped in scientific tradition knowledge may be conceptualized as truth or

principles.

It is a moot philosophical point whether all

knowledge can be expressed through mediums; undeniably,
a great deal of useful knowledge can be expressed through

mediums, and that is the present focus.
The adage "Knowledge is power" is true both individu-

ally and culturally.
part by knowledge.

Competency in a job is made up in
Job competency generally leads to

promotion and greater personal benefits.

In broad econo-

mic terms, knowledge contributes directly to productivity

and a nation must be productive in order to retain its

economic and political solvency.
These arguments for the beneficial effects of know-
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tion of literacy is the key to knowledge imbedded in the

language medium; the ability to comprehend the spoken word
only when situational cues are also present is insuffi-

cient to understand knowledge imbedded in more precise

linguistic structures.

The accumulation of this know-

ledge may result in personal gain or, more broadly, in

economic development, or the preservation of Western culture.

Olson

(

1978

)

in an article which traced the effects

that the development of alphabetic writing systems had
on the nature of knowledge, concluded:

The bias of written language toward providing
definitions, making all assumptions and premises
explicit, and observing the formal rules of logic
produces an instrument of considerable power for
building an abstract and coherent theory of reality.
The development of this explicit, formal system
accounts, I have argued, for the predominant features of Western culture and for our distinctive
ways of using language and our distinctive modes of
thought.
(p.2?8)

Traditionally, schools have been the cultural in-

stitution charged with the responsibility for passing on
knowledge.

The classical approach holds that this is

done through mastery of the three R's.

In recent decades,

however, graduation from high school has not guaranteed

literacy.

Schemes to take the pain out of learning to

read and write have supplanted much language instruction

with promises that knowledge may be gained from other
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mediums.

Any educational program which
diminishes the
importance of literacy runs the
risk of thwarting the

acquisition of structured bodies of
knowledge of social
and economic value, most of which
can be transmitted only
in linguistic terms because it
exists only or chiefly in
linguistic terms.

The blame for the devaluation of
literacy in recent
decades may not be ascribed entirely to
educational

policy makers.

It must be shared by certain scholars
who,

in their culturally-isolated studies of
cognitive develop-

ment, have been oblivious to the effects of
the acquisition

of literacy because it is common to all their
subjects.
Pi 3,get,

for example, did not take into account literacy's

contribution to cognitive development.
There have been voices to the contrary, chiefly from
the liberal arts, Havelock (I963) and Goody and Watt

(1968).

Now some psychologists are reconsidering the

effects of the acquisition of literacy--01son (I978),

Donaldson

(

1978

)

•

But in a culture mesmerized by visual

media and infatuated with notions of "autonomous" cognitive development,

their voices tend to be drowned.

To

preserve literate society and its economic and technological advantages, heed must be paid to the importance of

literacy in schooling.
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Appendix A

The Syllogisms, the Treatment Passages,

and the Yes-No Questions.
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FORM A;

Syllogism

1.

Control Condition;
All red-bellied spiders live in mango trees.

Anancy's friend, Bredda Thomas does not live in a mango tree.
I

told you that all red-bellied spiders live in mango trees,

and that Bredda Thomas does not live in a mango tree
Tell me something now, is Bredda Thomas a red-bellied

spider?

Treatment Condition;
All red-bellied spiders live in mango trees.

The mango

tree is the home of the red-bellied spider.

If a spider

has a red belly, it lives in a mango tree.

Anancy's friend, Bredda Thomas, does not live in a mango
tree.

Bredda Thomas does not like mango trees and he has

never lived in one.

I

told you that all red-bellied spiders

live in a mango tree.

Tell me something now, is Bredda Thomas a red-bellied

spider?
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Form A;

1.

Syllogism

1

continued

Ma.jor Premise Questions;

Tell me now, did
trees?

I

say that worms live in manso
^

Did I say that red-bellied spiders live in a
garden?
3*

Did I say that red-bellied spiders live in mango
trees?

Minor Premise "Questions
1.

Does Bredda Thomas live someplace that is not a
mango tree?

2.

Did

3«

Did I say for sure that Bredda Thomas lives in a
coconut tree?

I

say that Bredda Thomas lives in a mango tree?

Hook Questions in Recognition Block;
1.

Do you know for a fact that Bredda Thomas is a
worm?

2.

Is Bredda Thomas some animal that is not a redbellied spider?

3.

Is

Bredda Thomas a red-bellied spider?

FORM A;

Syllogism

2

Control Condition;

Listen carefully now, some of Anancy's neighbors are black
bears
All black bears eat berries.

Now

told you that some of Anancy's neighbors are black

I

bears, and that all black bears eat berries.

Lell me something now, do some of Anancy's neighbors eat

berries?

Treatment Condition:

Listen carefully now, some of Anancy's neighbors are black
bears.

Some black bears live near to Anancy, and Anancy,

the black bears, and the other animals get along together.

All black bears eat berries.

bushes in order to live.

Black bears eat berries

from

If a bear is black it will eat

berries
Now

told you that some of Anancy's neighbors are black

I

bears

,

and that all black bears eat berries

Tell me something now, do some of Anancy's neighbors eat

berries?
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FORM A;

Syllogism

2

continued

Ma.ior Premise Questions;
1.

Did I say that some of Anancy's neighbors were
black bears?

2.

Did I say all of Anancy's neighbors were black
bears?

3«

Do you think that not one of Anancy's neighbors
are bears?

Minor Premise Questions;
1.

Tell me now, did
berries?

2.

Did

3.

Do black bears eat berries?

I

I

say that large bears eat

say that black bears never eat berries?

Hook Questions in Recognition Block;
1.

Do you know for a fact that not one of Anancy's
neighbors eats berries?

2.

Do you know that all of Anancy's neighbors eat

berries?
3.

Do some of Anancy's neighbors eat berries?
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FORM B;

Syllog^ism

?

Control Condition;

Listen carefully now, all green lizards
eat mosquitoes.
Anancy s friend, Sista Camille does
not eat mosquitoes.

O.K.

told you that all green lizards eat
mosquitoes,

I

and that

Sista Camille does not eat mosquitoes.

Pell me something now, is Sista Camille a
green lizard?

Treatment

Condition;

Listen carefully now.

All green lizards eat mosquitoes.

Green lizards eat mosquitoes in order to live.
is green,

Anancy

s

If a lizard

then it will eat mosquitoes.
friend, Sista

Camille, does not eat mosquitoes.

Sista Camille thinks mosquitoes must taste terrible.

In

fact, she has never eaten one.
O.K.

I

told you that all green lizards eat mosquitoes,

and that Sista Camille does not eat mosquitoes.
Tell me something now, is Sista Camille a green lizard?
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FORM B;

Syllogism

3

continued;

Ma.ior Premise;
1.

Tell me now, did

2.

Did

I

say that green lizards eat moths?

3.

Did

I

say that green lizards eat mosquitoes?

I

say that frogs eat mosquitoes?

Minor Premise;
1.

Does Sista Camille eat something that is not
mosquitoes?

2.

Did

3.

Did I say for a fact that Sista Camille eats
lizards?

I

say that Sista Camille eats mosquitoes?

Hook Questions in Recognition Block;
1.

Do you know for a fact that Sista Camille is a
frog?

2.

Is Sista Camille some animal that is not a green

lizard?
3.

Is Sista

Camille a green lizard?
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FORM B;

Syllogism 4

Control Condition;

Listen well now, some of Anancy's friends are yellow bugs.
Hll yellow bugs lay white eggs.

You understand that some of Anancy’s friends are yellow
bugs and that all yellow bugs lay white eggs.

Can you tell me now, do some of Anancy's friends lay
white eggs?

Treatment Condition:
Listen to me now, some of Anancy's friends are yellow bugs.

Anancy likes yellow bugs and has many friends who are

yellow bugs along with his other friends.
All yellow bugs lay white eggs.
have their young.

In white eggs the bugs

If a bug is yellow,

its egg is white.

You understand that some of Anancy's friends are yellow
bugs and that all yellow bugs lay white eggs.
white
Can you tell me now, do some of Anancy’s friends lay

eggs?
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FORM B;

Syllogiism 4 continued;

Ma.jor Premise;
1.

Did I say that some of Anancy's friends were
yellow bugs?

2.

Did I say that all of Anancy's friends are yellow
bugs?

3.

Do you think that not one of Anancy’s friends is
a yellow bug?

Minor Premise
say that big bugs lay white

1.

Tell me now, did
eggs?

2.

Did

I

say that yellow bugs never lay white eggs?

3.

Did

I

say that yellow bugs lay white eggs?

I

Hook Questions in Recognition Block:
Anancy's

1.

Do you know for a fact that none of
friends lay white eggs?

2.

Do you know that all of Anancy’s friends lay white

eggs?
3.

Do some of Anancy’s friends lay white eggs?
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Appendix B

Instructions for the Cloze Passage
On this page there is written a story about Anancy

and Lizard.

I

am going to ask you to read it to your-

self, but it is different from just reading because you

can help make up the story by filling in the blanks with

words which you think belong there.

If you feel that a

word that you know belongs there in the story and in the
sentence, you write the word in.
I’ll help you with the first paragraph.
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Appendix

C

The Cloze Passage

Once upon a time King Robert had a very pretty

daughter who had a secret name which only she and her
father knew.

One day when her father thought that she

was old enough to get married, the King went out

said that any man who could

secret name would

the princess's

her for his wife

Anancy

Lizard who lived in the

yard and who were very
minds

friends, made up their

they were going to try

the princess's secret

.

find out

So the two of them

walked upon the

out for the King's palace.

Anancy spun a web and walked

ground
the air.

them got to the palace

When the two

Anancy just sailed over

wall like nothing flat,

poor Lizard was crawling under

but

palace gate, one of the

birds chased him away.

ran and hid himself in

So
the trees

of one of

the palace and waited to

what

happened to Anancy
Anancy
he made and went

upon the air on the
the King's palace and hid

that
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in the princess's bedroom closet.

was going to

rny

the princess

Anancy saw the King kiss

upon her cheek and heard
f

And

say,

little Kosuka."

said and caught the

"I

hope you sleep

Anancy heard
,

So Anancy made up his

to go home and dress

himself and come back to

Anancy sailed back

the princess

the palace upon his web.

was whispering the princess's name

over to himself to prevent
"Kosuka!

Kosuka!

he

Kosuka!"

and

from forgetting it,
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Appendix D

Interviewer s' Preliminary Instruction to Sub.iects
Goodmorning,

I

am

i

am conduct-

ing interviews as a part of a study being conducted by
the University of Massachusetts here in Jamaica.

The

study is about how people with different educational
levels reason about stories.

All that it requires is for

you to think about the stories that

I

am going to tell

you and then for you to answer the questions that
going to ask you.

It is not difficult;

I

am

all you must do

is listen carefully about my stories and answer the

questions about what

I

said.

No doubt, you will think

that it is simple and childs play, and you will probably

enjoy doing it.

Before

I

I

hope you can spare me a little time.

start, can you tell me a little about yourself?

(The socioeconomic status questionnaire was asked

orally

me.

.

I

am going to ask you to play some word games with

I

am going to tell you a short story about Anancy and

his animal friends,

then

questions about the story

am going to ask you some

I
I

told you.

The questions can

be answered by listening to the words of the story and think-

ing about them.

Then I'll ask you to tell me in your own

words the story that

I

told you, so that

I

can write it
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down.

For example,

I

tell you:

"All Anancy's animal friends

can talk to each other.

And all animals that can talk to

each other are clever."

Next,

of anancy's friends clever?"

yes or no.

And when

I

I'll ask you:

"Are all

Then you will tell me,

In this case you would tell me "yes."

ask you why you would say because all of

Anancy's friends can talk to each other, and that all
animals that can talk to each other are clever.

You see,

by putting the words together, you know that Anancy's

friends are clever.
the story is true.

about what

I

Then

I

will ask you some questions

told you, so try to remember the exact words

of the story.
I

You do not need to worry whether

For instance,

I

might ask you:

"Did

tell you that some of Anancy's friends talk to each

other?"

You would tell me

because what

I

actually

said was that all of Anancy's friends talked to each other.

You see, you must listen carefully.
seem to you that

I

Sometimes it might

am asking the same question over and

me.
over, but please think about it each time and answer

own
Finally, I'll ask you to tell me the story in your

words so that

I

can write it down.

ask you to
We'll play the game four times then I'll
I'll explain more about
help make up a story about Anancy.

the story when we come to it.

want to go on, we will stop.

If you get tired and don't
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Appendix E

Socioeconomic Questionnaire
Have you worked outside of the house sometime in the
last year?

1.

»^lhat

2

did you do?

(A

TASK not a place of work)

How old are you now?

.

3.

How far did you reach in school?

4.

Is that when you were a youngster?

How old were you when you finished school?
5.

Did you ever attend a JAMAL class?
What level did you enter?
How long did you study in JAMAL?

What was the color of your last book?

What level did you finish?

How many years ago was that?
6.

Tell me now, how much time did you spend reading last
week?

7

What kinds of things did you read?

.

8.

What newspapers or magazines did you read last week?
The Daily News
The Star.

;

The Sunday Sun

;

The Gleaner

;

